APRIL, 2000




D.O. No.6(3)(53)/98-LC(LS)


April 13, 2000


Dear Shri Jethmalaniji,


            I am forwarding herewith the 173rd Report on “Prevention of Terrorism Bill, 2000”.


2.         The Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India requested the Commission to undertake a fresh examination of the issue of a suitable legislation for combating terrorism and other anti-national activities in view of the fact that security environment has changed drastically since 1972 when the Law Commission had sent its 43rd Report on offences against the national security.  The Government emphasised that the subject was of utmost urgency because the erstwhile Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention)

Act, 1987 had lapsed and no other law had been enacted to fill the vaccum arising therefrom.  The Commission was asked to take a holistic view on the need for a comprehensive anti-terrorism law in the country.  The Commission circulated a working paper to all the concerned authorities, organisations and individuals for eliciting their views with respect to the proposals contained therein.  Two seminars were also held for this purpose. 


3.         The Commission took note of several points addressed by the speakers and after taking into consideration the several opinions expressed in these two seminars and the responses received, the present Report has been prepared. 


4.         The Commission has taken into consideration the original Criminal Law Amendment Bill, 1995 introduced in Rajya Sabha, as also the Official Amendments proposed by the Ministry of Home Affairs which are set out in the working paper (Annexure –I) annexed with this Report.  The Report brings out that a legislation to fight terrorism is today a necessity in India.  It is not as if the enactment of such a legislation would by itself subdue terrorism.  It may, however, arm the State to fight terrorism more effectively.  Besides recommending for various measures to combat terrorism, the Commission has at the same time provided  adequate safeguards designed to advance the human rights aspects and to prevent abuse of power.  We have thoroughly revised the Criminal Law Amendment Bill and have suggested a new Bill “Prevention of Terrorism Bill” for it.

5.         For the sake of convenience, the Bill entitled “Prevention of Terrorism Bill, 2000”  as modified by the Law Commission is  annexed with the Report.


With  warm regards,


Yours sincerely,



(B.P. Jeevan Reddy)

Shri Ram Jethmalani,

Minister for Law, Justice & Co. Affairs,

Shastri Bhavan,

New Delhi


                 Sl.No.         Contents                       
                   1.           CHAPTER I
                    2.        CHAPTER II
                                          SECURITY SITUATION IN                                                  THE COUNTRY
                   3.        CHAPTER III               
WHETHER THE PRESENT                                    LEGISLATION IS AT ALL NECESSARY?                   
                   4.        CHAPTER IV          
                      PARTs I-III OF THE CRIMINAL                                                     LAW AMENDMENT BILL
                   5.         CHAPTER V
                          PART IV OF THE CRIMINAL LAW
             AMENDMENT BILL
                   6.        CHAPTER VI
                           SUGGESTIONS FOR INCLUSION OF
                           CERTAIN ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS
         IN THE BILL
                7.        ANNEXURE I
                           WORKING PAPER ON LEGISLATION
                             TO COMBAT TERRORISM             
8.                    ANNEXURE II
                        OF TERRORISM BILL, 2000
                       CHAPTER I         
         The Government of India in the Ministry  of  Home
        Affairs requested the Law Commission to undertake a fresh
        examination  of  the  issue of a suitable legislation for
        combating terrorism and other anti-national activities in
        view of the fact that security  environment  has  changed
        drastically  since  1972 when the Law Commission had sent
        its  43rd  Report  on  Offences  against   the   National
        Security.  The government emphasised that the subject was
        of  utmost  urgency  in  view  of the fact that while the
        erstwhile   Terrorists    and    Disruptive    Activities
        (Prevention)  Act, 1987 had lapsed, no other law had been
        enacted to fill the vacuum arising therefrom.  The result
        is that today there is no  law  to  combat  terrorism  in
        India.   The Commission was asked to take a holistic view
        on the need for a  comprehensive  anti-terrorism  law  in
        India    after    taking   into   consideration   similar
        legislations enacted in other countries  faced  with  the
        problem of  terrorism.    Accordingly, the Commission had
        taken up the study of the subject and prepared a  Working
        Paper  (Annexure  I)  which  was  circulated  to  all the
        concerned authorities, organisations and individuals  for
        eliciting  their  views  with  respect  to  the proposals
        contained therein.  Two seminars were also held for  this
        purpose.  The first seminar was held on December 20, 1999
        at the  India  International  Centre,  New Delhi.  It was
        inaugurated by Shri Justice J.S.    Verma,  former  Chief
        Justice  of  India  and  presently the Chairperson of the
        National Human Rights Commission.  The following  persons
        spoke at the  said  seminar:    Shri  P.P.    Rao, Senior
        Advocate, Supreme  Court  and  former  President  of  the
        Supreme Court  Bar  Association,  Brig.    Satbir  Singh,
        Senior Fellow and OSD in Institute  for  Defence  Studies
        and Analysis, Prof.     V.S.    Mani,  Jawarharlal  Nehru
        University and Secretary-General, the Indian  Society  of
        International Law,  Shri  K.T.S.  Tulsi, Senior Advocate,
        Supreme Court and former  Additional  Solicitor  General,
        Shri D.R.      Karthikeyan,   former  Director,  CBI  and
        presently  holding  the   post   of   DG(Investigations),
        National  Human Rights Commission, Shri Prashant Bhushan,
        Advocate, Supreme Court and an activist in  human  rights
        field, Prof.  B.B.  Pandey of Delhi University, Shri P.S.
        Rao, Legal Adviser, Legal and Treaties Division, Ministry
        of External  Affairs,  Shri  K.P.S.    Gill,  former DGP,
        Punjab, Shri Ravi  Nair  from  South  Asia  Human  Rights
        Documentation Centre,   Ms.      Kamini  Jaiswal,  Senior
        Advocate, Supreme Court and  an  activist  in  the  human
        rights field, Shri  Shiv  Basant  and Dr.  P.K.  Agarwal,
        Joint Secretaries in the Ministry of Home  Affairs,  Shri
        B.A.    Agrawal,   Joint  Secretary  and  Legal  Adviser,
        Ministry of Law,  Justice  &  Co.    Affairs,  Shri  S.V.
        Singh, Additional  DGP  Crime,  Punjab,  Shri S.S.  Puri,
        Additional DGP(L&O),  Maharashtra,  Shri  M.L.    Sharma,
        Joint Director,  CBI,  Shri  N.   Kumar, Senior Advocate,
        Supreme Court,  Shri  Justice  Rajinder  Sachhar,  Senior
        Advocate and former Chief Justice, Delhi High Court.
         The  Commission made a note of the points made by
        all the above speakers.  Shri Tulsi  has  also  sent  his
        comments in writing.  The Addl.  DGP, CID, Assam has sent
        his comments  in writing.  Amnesty International has also
        sent a communication in this behalf  dated  December  18,
        1999.   Though  the said organisation said in this letter
        that they would be sending a detailed response later, the
        Commission has not so  far  received  any  such  detailed
         A  second seminar was held on January 29, 2000 in
        association with the India International  Centre  in  the
        auditorium of  India International Centre.  The following
        persons spoke at this seminar:  Shri N.N.  Vohra,  former
        Home  Secretary  and  Director of the India International
        Centre  (who   co-chaired   the   seminar),   Shri   R.K.
        Khandelwal,    former    Chairman,   Joint   Intelligence
        Committee,  Shri  Prashant  Bhushan,  Advocate,   Supreme
        Court, Shri P.K.    Dave,  former Lt.  Governor of Delhi,
        Shri S.K.  Singh, former Foreign  Secretary,  Ms.    Maja
        Daruwalla,    Director,    Commonwealth    Human   Rights
        Initiative, Air  Chief  Marshal  N.C.     Suri,   Lt.Gen.
        Raghavan, Shri  P.N.   Lekhi, Senior Advocate, Delhi High
        Court, Shri D.R.  Karthikeyan, DG(Investigations),  NHRC,
        Shri U.R.    Lalit,  Senior Advocate, Supreme Court, Shri
        Ashok Bhan, Advocate (Kashmiri Pandit  -  migrant),  Shri
        K.P.S.  Gill,  former DGP, Punjab, Shri P.P.  Rao, Senior
        Advocate, Supreme Court, Dr.  Ajit Muzoomdar, IAS(Retd.),
        Shri Sushil Kumar, Senior Advocate, Supreme  Court,  Shri
        P.S.   Rao, Joint Secretary, Legal and Treaties Division,
        Ministry of External Affairs, Brig.  Satbir Singh, Senior
        Fellow and OSD in the Institute for Defence  Studies  and
        Analysis  and  Shri  Ravi  Nair from the South Asia Human
        Rights Documentation Centre.  (On account of  paucity  of
        time,  several other participants could not speak on this
        occasion.) Shri H.D.  Shourie, Director, "Common  Cause",
        sent  his  written comments since he could not attend the
        seminar personally.    Other  persons  who  sent  written
        comments include the following:    Dr.    M.L.   Chibber,
        General(Retd.), Shri L.  David, IPS, Assam,  Shri  K.T.S.
        Tulsi,  Senior  Advocate,  Shri Rakesh Shukla, Secretary,
        Peoples'  Union  for   Democratic   Rights,   Shri   K.G.
        Kannibaran,  President,  PUCL, Shri Tapan Bose, Secretary
        General, South-East Forum for  Human  Rights,  Shri  D.R.
        Karthikeyan,   Director   General,  NHRC  and  Shri  A.K.
        Srivastava, Judge  Advocate  General's  Branch.    Later,
        South  Asia Human Rights Documentation Centre also sent a
        written representation.
         The Commission has taken note of  several  points
        made by   the   above   speakers.     After  taking  into
        consideration the several opinions expressed in these two
        seminars and the responses received, the  present  report
        has been prepared.
                            CHAPTER II          
         In  its  Working Paper the Law Commission had set
        out the following facts and figures in paragraphs 1.2  to
        1.15 in chapter I.  They read as follows:
         "1.2    The  law  and  order  situation  for some
                years  has  continued  to  remain  disturbed   in
                several parts    of    India.      Militant   and
                secessionist activities in Jammu and Kashmir  and
                the    insurgency-related    terrorism   in   the
                North-East have  been  major  areas  of  concern.
                Bomb  blasts  in  different parts of the country,
                including  those  in  Tamil   Nadu,   constituted
                another disquieting  feature.    There  has  been
                extensive smuggling in of arms and explosives  by
                various terrorists groups.  The seizures of these
                items,  which represent but a small percentage of
                the total quantities brought in indicate the kind
                of  sophisticated  arms  and   explosives   being
                brought into the country illegally.
          The    security    situation    in   some
                states/regions of the country is indicated below.
         1.3     Jammu and Kashmir
          There  have  been  45,182  incidents   of
                terrorist  violence  in  J&K  since 1988 and upto
                March 1999.  In  this  violence,  20,506  persons
                have lost   their   lives.    3421  incidents  of
                violence took place in Jammu  and  Kashmir  which
                included  2198  cases  of  killing in 1997 alone.
                5523 incidents and 2858 killings  took  place  in
                1996.  In  1998, there were 2213 killings.  There
                were numerous  cases  of  abductions,  robberies,
                extortions,  explosions,  incidents  of arson and
                killings.  Civilians remained the  major  victims
                of violence (1333 killed in 1996, 864 in 1997 and
                416 in the year 1998 upto June).  Security forces
                personnel,  `friendly  militants'  and  political
                activists  were  the  priority  targets  of   the
                militants.   There  has  been  an increase in the
                number of casualties among security forces.
         1.3.1   The  militants  are  found  to  be   well
                trained.   Most  of  them  are of foreign origin.
                Mercenaries and fanatic fundamentalist terrorists
                from  Afghanistan,  Sudan,  Pakistan  and   other
                countries  are  being  inducted increasingly into
                this movement.  According to several reports, one
                of the prime targets of  international  terrorist
                leaders, like  Osama  Bin Laden, is Kashmir.  The
                terrorism in India has  thus  become  a  part  of
                international  terrorism  and  India  one  of its
                prime targets.  Their targets are security forces
                personnel,   political    activists,    `friendly
                militants',   suspected   informers   and   their
                families, as also  Hindus  residing  in  isolated
                pockets.   They  indulge in acts of demonstrative
                violence, mainly with  the  help  of  explosives;
                induction   of   more   and   more  sophisticated
                weaponry, including anti-aircraft guns  and  RDX.
                They  have  extended  the arc of terrorism to the
                Jammu region, particularly  Rajouri,  Poonch  and
                Doda districts.
         1.3.2   The  militancy  in  Jammu and Kashmir has
                left a large number of  Hindu  families  homeless
                and  they  had to migrate to other places outside
                the State.
         1.4     Punjab
          The State remains vulnerable to  sporadic
                terrorist   actions   by   the  remnants  of  the
                militants, numbering about 300, who appear to  be
                under pressure to revive the separatist movement.
                The  militant  bodies  are  funded  and  equipped
                mainly by overseas activists.
         1.4.1   The need for high level of vigil in order
                to checkmate any attempts at revival of terrorism
                in the State, hardly need be overemphasised.
         1.5     North-Eastern Region
          Militant activities of various  insurgent
                and  extremist  groups  and  ethnic tensions have
                kept the conditions disturbed in large  areas  of
                the North East.
         1.5.1   In  Assam,  ULFA, Bodo and Naga militancy
                shows an upward trend in 1998, accounting for 735
                incidents (603 killings) as against 427 incidents
                (370 killings) in 1997.  This trend has continued
                in the first eight  months  of  1999,  which  has
                witnessed 298 incidents (208 killings).  Nalbari,
                Nagaon  and  Kamrup  districts  remain  the worst
                affected and Lakhimpur, Dibrugarh,  Goalpara  and
                Jorhat  districts  moderately  affected  by  ULFA
         1.5.2   The Bodo militants were  responsible  for
                178  incidents (215 killings) in 1997, as against
                213 incidents  (260  killings)  in  1996.    Bodo
                militants were also responsible for 10 explosions
                (22 deaths)  in  1997.    During  1998, an upward
                trend has been evident.
         1.5.3   The NSCN(I) and its satellite,  the  Dima
                Halam  Deogah (DHD) in NC Hills and Karbi Anglong
                districts and the NSCN(K) in Golaghat, Jorhat and
                Sibsagar  districts  also  indulged  in   violent
                activities.   There  was  a `ceasefire' agreement
                (July 25,  1997)  between  the  NSCN(I)  and  the
                Government of India.
         1.5.4   Overall  militancy  in  Assam  showed  an
                upswing in 1998, accounting for 735 incidents  as
                against 427  in  1997.    The  upward  trend  has
                continued in the  first  eight  months  of  1999.
                Police,    security    forces    personnel    and
                uncooperative  businessmen  have  been  the  main
                targets of the outfits.
         1.6     In  Manipur, despite large scale security
                forces operations, there has been a sharp rise in
                the overall violence, involving  Naga,  Kuki  and
                Valley   extremists,   as   also   ethnic  groups
                resulting in several deaths.
         1.6.1   The State witnessed a  particularly  high
                rate   of   security   forces  casualties  -  111
                personnel lost their lives in 92 ambushes in 1997
                as against 65 killed in 105 ambushes in 1996.  As
                against total 417 incidents and 241  killings  in
                1996,  these  groups  were  responsible  for  742
                incidents in which 575  persons  were  killed  in
                1997.   In  1998,  250 persons were killed in 345
                incidents.  During 1999 (upto August), there have
                been 153 incidents claiming 100 lives.
         1.7     In Nagaland, there was no let up by  NSCN
                and  its  factions in its violent activities such
                as  extortions,   abductions   and   attacks   on
                civilians, etc.      In   1998,  there  were  202
                incidents which claimed 40 lives.    Upto  August
                1999,  10 persons have been killed in 126 violent
         1.8     In Tripura,  violent  activities  of  the
                various  tribal  organisations  like the ATTF and
                the  NLFT,  and  assorted   groups   of   lawless
                elements, continued.  During 1997, there were 303
                violent   incidents,  involving  270  deaths,  as
                against 391 incidents (178 deaths) in 1996.    In
                1998,  251  persons  were  killed  in 568 violent
                incidents.   During  1999  (till   August),   417
                incidents   of   violence   have  been  reported,
                resulting in 152 deaths.
         1.8.1   The violence in all  above  cases  mostly
                took  the  form  of ambushes, looting, extortion,
                kidnapping  for  ransom,  highway  robberies  and
                attacks  on trucks/vehicles as well as attacks on
                the   security   forces   personnel,   government
                officials and suspected informers.
         1.9     In Meghalaya, on the militancy front, the
                level  of  violence  and killings by the HNLC and
                Achik National Volunteer Council remained  almost
                unchanged.   It is feared that in the North-East,
                certain  development  funds  allocated   by   the
                Central Government have been siphoned off to fund
                insurgent groups.    The  insurgent groups in the
                North-East  are  also  being  helped  across  the
                country's borders  with  illegal arms.  They were
                responsible for three deaths in 14  incidents  in
                1997  and 14 killings in 16 incidents in 1998 and
                22 killings in 28 incidents in 1999 (till  August
         1.10    Religious Fundamentalist Militancy
          Religious   militancy,  which  had  first
                raised its head in 1993 with bomb  explosions  in
                Mumbai, continue  to  make its presence felt.  In
                1997, there were 23 blasts  in  Delhi  and  three
                each in  Haryana  and Uttar Pradesh.  In the year
                1998,  Mumbai  witnessed  three  explosions  just
                before the  Parliamentary  elections.   Al-Ummah,
                the Principal fundamentalist militant  outfit  of
                Southern  India, was responsible for 17 blasts in
                different  areas  of   Coimbatore   (Tamil   Nadu
                February 1998).
         1.10.1  A  number  of miscreants, including a few
                Pakistan nationals  and  Bangladeshis,  who  were
                responsible  for  the  blasts  in  North India in
                1997, were   arrested.      Investigations   have
                provided  ample  evidence of a sinister game plan
                to undermine the internal security and  integrity
                of the  country.  Efforts are being made to forge
                an  alliance   between   Muslim   militants   and
                terrorists of Punjab and J&K.  Bases in Nepal and
                Bangladesh, in addition to those in Pakistan, are
                being    utilised    for   launching   disruptive
                operations in India.  Recruits are  being  picked
                up   from   amongst   fundamentalist   youth  for
                undergoing training in Pakistan as a  prelude  to
                being  inducted into Pakistan's proxy war against
                India.  Weapons and explosives are  being  pumped
                into   the   country   in  large  quantities,  in
                pursuance of the above game plan."
         Indeed,  over  the  last  few  months  since  the
        Working  Paper  was  released, the security situation has
        worsened.   The  hijacking  of  Indian  Airlines  flight,
        IC-814,  the release of three notorious terrorists by the
        Government of India to save the  lives  of  the  innocent
        civilians and the crew of the said flight, the subsequent
        declarations   of   the  released  terrorists  and  their
        activities both in  Pakistan  and  the  Pakistan-occupied
        Kashmir,  have  raised  the  level  of  terrorism both in
        quality and extent.  The repeated attacks  upon  security
        forces  and  their  camps by terrorists including suicide
        squads is a new phenomenon adding a  dangerous  dimension
        to the terrorist activity in India.  Even in the last two
        months,  substantial  quantities  of  RDX  and  arms  and
        ammunition have been recovered from various parts of  the
        country.   Indeed,  it  is now believed that the plan for
        hijacking of the Indian Airlines flight was  hatched  and
        directed from within the country.
         After  setting out the facts in paragraphs 1.2 to
        1.15 in chapter I of the Working  Paper,  the  Commission
        summed up the position in the following words:
          "Some  time back, the Union Home Minister
                declared his intention to release a  white  paper
                dealing  with  subversive  activities of the ISI.
                The ISI-sponsored terrorism  and  proxy  war  has
                resulted  in  deaths  of  29,151 civilians, 5,101
                security   personnel   and   2,730    explosions.
                Property  worth  Rs.2,000  crores  is reported to
                have been damaged.    Almost  43,700  kg.      of
                explosives,  mostly  RDX,  had  been inducted and
                61,900 sophisticated weapons  had  been  smuggled
                into India.     It  is  estimated  that  security
                related costs in countering ISI's activities have
                totalled an  amount  of  Rs.64,000  crores  (Vide
                Economic  Times,  New  Delhi,  21 December, 1998,
                p.2) - which could alternatively have been  spent
                on  better  purposes  like  education, health and
         1.16.1  A  perception  has  developed  among  the
                terrorist   groups   that  the  Indian  State  is
                inherently incapable of meeting  their  challenge
                that it  has  become  soft  and  indolent.   As a
                matter of fact, quite a few  parties  and  groups
                appear  to  have developed a vested interest in a
                soft State, a weak government and an  ineffective
                implementation of the laws.  Even certain foreign
                powers   are   interested   in  destablising  our
                country.  Foreign funds are flowing substantially
                to various organisations and groups which  serve,
                whether  wittingly  or unwittingly, the long-term
                objectives of the foreign powers."
         We do not see any reason to depart from the  said
         In   Chapter   II   of  the  Working  Paper,  the
        Commission had set out the provisions  of  The  Terrorist
        and  Disruptive  Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (TADA)
        and the decisions of the Supreme Court thereon.    We  do
        not  think  it  necessary  to  reproduce the same in this
        report over again since we are enclosing a  copy  of  the
        Working Paper to this report.  It must, however, be added
        that  it  has  since  been brought to our notice that the
        State of Maharashtra has  enacted  a  law  to  deal  with
        organised  crime,  namely,  The  Maharashtra  Control  of
        Organised Crime Act, 1999.  The Commission has taken note
        of the provisions of the Maharashtra  Act  and  would  be
        referred to at the appropriate stage.
         In   Chapter   III  of  the  Working  Paper,  the
        Commission had set out in extenso the provisions  of  the
        U.S.A.  Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
        1996 and   the   following  U.K.    Acts  as  well  as  a
        Consultation Paper:
        1. The   Prevention    of    Terrorism    (Temporary
                Provisions) Act, 1989.
        2. Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1996
                as amended in 1998.
        3. The  Criminal  Justice (Terrorism and Conspiracy)
                Act, 1998 and
        4. The provisions of a Consultation Paper issued  by
                the Government  of  U.K.    in  December  1998 on
                "Legislation Against Terrorism (Cm 4178)".
         We do not think it  necessary  to  reproduce  the
        contents  of Chapter III of the Working Paper here again,
        as a copy of the Working Paper is  enclosed  herewith  as
        Annexure I.   It is, however, necessary to point out that
        the  British   Parliament   has   since   introduced   an
        anti-terrorism  Bill in the House of Commons, on December
        2, 1999.  The Act is a comprehensive piece of legislation
        containing as many as 99 sections and 14 Schedules.   The
        Law Commission  has  perused  the said Bill.  It would be
        appropriate to mention briefly the contents of  the  said
        Bill.   Section  1 defines "terrorism" and the associated
        expression "action" in the following words:
         "Terrorism:  interpretation.
         1.(1) In this Act "terrorism" means  the  use  or
                threat, for the purpose of advancing a political,
                religious or ideological cause, of action which-
         (a)  involves serious violence against any person
                or property,
         (b) endangers the life of any person, or
         (c) creates a  serious  risk  to  the  health  or
                safety of the public or a section of the public.
         (2) In subsection (1)-
         (a)  "action"  includes action outside the United
         (b) a reference to any person or to property is a
                reference to any person, or to property, wherever
                situated, and
         (c)  a  reference  to  the  public   includes   a
                reference  to  the public of a country other than
                the United Kingdom.
         (3) In this Act a reference to action  taken  for
                the purposes of terrorism includes a reference to
                action  taken  for  the  benefit  of a proscribed
         Part two containing sections 3 to 12  deals  with
        proscribed organisations mentioned in Schedule two.  This
        Part provides for notifying the proscribed organisations,
        appeals  against  such orders and the effect of declaring
        an organisation as a proscribed organisation followed  by
        forfeiture of  its properties.  Any person who belongs to
        such organisation or  supports  the  activities  of  such
        organisation,  is  liable  to be prosecuted and punished.
        Part three  containing  sections  13  to  30  deals  with
        `terrorist  property'  including  proceeds  of terrorism.
        The provisions in this Chapter prohibit raising of  funds
        for  terrorist  activity  including  money laundering and
        provide for seizure, detention and forfeiture of property
        of terrorists as well as cash belonging  to  them.    The
        Chapter  also  places  an obligation upon the citizens to
        disclose information relating to terrorist  activity  and
        to cooperate  with  the police in that behalf.  Part four
        containing  sections  31   to   37   include   provisions
        concerning terrorist  investigations.    These provisions
        empower the police to cordon areas, to search and to take
        other actions  in  the  cordoned  areas  as  detailed  in
        Schedule five  and  other  allied  provisions.  Part five
        contains sections 38 to 51 dealing with counter-terrorist
        powers of the police.  Section 38 defines the  expression
        "terrorist" in the following words:
         "38.  (1) In this part "terrorist" means a person
         (a)   has  committed  an  offence  under  any  of
                sections 10, 11, 14 to 17, 52 and 54 to 56, or
         (b) is or has been concerned in  the  commission,
                preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism.
         (2)  The  reference  in  subsection  (1)(b)  to a
                person who has been concerned in the  commission,
                preparation  or  instigation of acts of terrorism
                includes a reference to a person  who  has  been,
                whether  before or after the passing of this Act,
                concerned  in  the  commission,  preparation   or
                instigation  of  acts  of  terrorism  within  the
                meaning given by section 1."
         The provisions in this Part empower the police to
        arrest without warrant, search premises and persons, stop
        and  search  vehicles  and  the   provisions   incidental
        thereto.    The   police   is  also  empowered  to  place
        restrictions on and to regulate parking, to impose  ports
        and  border  controls  and  to  search,  seize and detain
        terrorists and their properties.    Part  six  containing
        sections  52  to  61  deals with "miscellaneous" matters.
        The provisions in this Part deal with terrorist  offences
        including  possession  of  arms  and explosives (which is
        made an offence),  with  training  in  weapons  including
        biological,   chemical   and  nuclear  weapons  and  with
        collecting information, etc.  useful to terrorists.   The
        British    Parliament   has   assumed   extra-territorial
        jurisdiction  in  this   behalf   in   the   sense   that
        preparations  for  carrying out terrorist offences in any
        other  country  (other  than  the  U.K.)  are  also  made
        punishable  in U.K., which is a good development from our
        country's point of view.  Part seven containing  sections
        62 to 109 deals with Northern Ireland.  The provisions in
        this  Chapter  are  far  more  stringent in all respects.
        Part eight containing sections 110  to  124  carries  the
        heading "general".    This  part specifies the additional
        powers of the police conferred by the Bill over and above
        the common law powers and the extent of such  powers  and
        certain other matters.
         Chapter  five  of  the Working Paper sets out the
        proposals put forward by the Law  Commission  for  public
        debate and discussion.
         As  stated  hereinbefore,  the Law Commission has
        considered the responses received and the  various  views
        expressed at  the  two seminars.  So far as the structure
        of our report is concerned, we  must  reiterate  that  we
        have  taken  the  Criminal  Law  Amendment Bill, 1995, as
        proposed to be amended by the Official Amendments as  the
        basis.   The  reasons  for  this  approach are not far to
        seek.  The TADA - whose improved version is  the  present
        Bill  -  was  in force for more than ten years; indeed it
        continues to be available for the  pending  cases.    The
        constitutionality of the Act and the meaning and scope of
        its  provisions  have  been the subject-matter of several
        decisions of the Supreme Court and the High Courts.    In
        this  view, we thought that instead of drafting a new law
        altogether, it would be more appropriate - and convenient
        - to take the Criminal  Law  Amendment  Bill  along  with
        official  amendments as the basis and suggest appropriate
        modifications and additions, wherever found necessary.
         In the interest of convenience  and  clarity,  we
        shall   deal  with  the  sections  in  the  Criminal  Law
        Amendment Bill, as introduced in Rajya Sabha on 18th May,
        1995 (together with the proposed "official"  amendments),
        chapter-wise,  and suggest modifications and additions in
        the light of  the  responses  received  pursuant  to  the
        circulation  of the Working Paper and the views expressed
        in the seminars.
                              CHAPTER III          
                 IS AT ALL NECESSARY?
         The   representatives   of   the   human   rights
        organisations  and other activists in that field, namely,
        S/Shri Prashant Bhushan, Advocate,  Supreme  Court,  Ravi
        Nair  from  the  South  Asia  Human  Rights Documentation
        Centre, V.S.   Mani  from  Jawaharlal  Nehru  University,
        Kamini Jaiswal, Advocate, Supreme Court, Justice Rajinder
        Sachar,  former  Chief Justice of Delhi High Court, Prof.
        B.B.  Pande  of  Delhi  University  and  Maja  Daruwalla,
        Director,    Commonwealth    Human   Rights   Initiative,
        questioned the very necessity of such  a  legislation  at
        the present  juncture.    Similar  stand was taken by The
        Peoples Union  for  Civil  Liberties  (PUCL)  (who  while
        declining  to  participate in the seminars, chose to send
        the comments of Shri K.G.   Kannabiran  on  each  of  the
        features  of  the Bill), The Peoples Union for Democratic
        Rights (PUDR) (letter from Shri  Rakesh  Shukla)  and  by
        another organisation "South Asia Forum for Human Rights".
        They  submitted  that the proposed legislation was indeed
        the very same TADA, in a new garb.  Indeed, some of  them
        contended that the provisions of the proposed legislation
        are harsher  than the provisions of TADA.  They submitted
        that TADA was widely abused and  misused  by  the  police
        authorities  while  it  was  in force and that it had not
        succeeded in checking terrorism.  They submitted  that  a
        number  of  accused  who  were  arrested  and  were being
        prosecuted under the  TADA,  were  still  languishing  in
        jails and their cases were still pending trial before the
        designated  courts  notwithstanding  the  fact  that TADA
        itself had lapsed in the year 1995.  If  TADA  could  not
        successfully counter terrorism, they asked, how could the
        present legislation  succeed.    They  submitted that the
        police in this country is notorious for its third  degree
        methods  and  illegal  methods  of investigation which is
        indeed the  byproduct  of  their  inefficiency.      They
        submitted further that the Law Commission should not look
        to U.K.  and U.S.  or to the anti-terrorism laws in force
        there,  because  the standards of behaviour of the police
        in those countries were far more civilised and consistent
        with the norms of law.  Introducing provisions similar to
        the provisions existing in those enactments would not  be
        appropriate,  they  submitted, inasmuch as the social and
        political standards and the level of consciousness of the
        citizens of this country are not the same as that of U.K.
        or U.S.A.  The policeman is held in awe in  this  country
        and this legislation would clothe him with more arbitrary
        powers  which cannot but result in harassment of innocent
        persons besides being unable to  achieve  its  objective.
        They further raised the point that before enacting such a
        legislation  there  must be a far wider debate throughout
        the country and that the Commission must also  look  into
        and  verify  several  abuses which had occurred under the
        TADA.  They submitted that human rights of  the  citizens
        of this country would be in great peril if such a law was
        enforced.   Another  submission  put forward by Shri K.G.
        Kannabiran  is  that  terrorism  is  a   consequence   of
        socio-economic  injustice  and is thus really a political
        problem and not a  `law  and  order'  or  `public  order'
         On the  other  hand,  Brig.  Satbir Singh, Senior
        Fellow and OSD in the Institute of  Defence  Studies  and
        Analysis, Shri  K.T.S.    Tulsi, Senior Advocate, Supreme
        Court, Shri K.P.S.  Gill, former DGP, Punjab,  Shri  Shiv
        Basant,  Joint  Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs, Shri
        S.V.  Singh, Addl.  DGP, Punjab, Shri S.S.   Puri,  Addl.
        DGP, Maharashtra, Shri M.L.  Sharma, Joint Director, CBI,
        Dr.  P.K.    Agarwal,  Joint  Secretary, Ministry of Home
        Affairs, Shri P.K.  Dave, former Lt.  Governor of  Delhi,
        Shri S.K.    Singh,  former  Foreign Secretary, Shri U.R.
        Lalit,  Senior  Advocate,  Supreme   Court,   Shri   A.K.
        Shrivastava, Judge-Advocate-General, Army, Lt.Gen.(Retd.)
        Dr.  M.L.  Chibber,  Shri  L.   David, Addl.  DGP, Assam,
        Shri H.N.  Ray, former Finance Secretary,  Government  of
        India  and  Shri  Ashok  Bhan,  Advocate  and  a Kashmiri
        migrant Pandit, called for a more stringent law than  the
        one proposed.   They submitted that some of the proposals
        put forward by Law Commission  with  a  view  to  provide
        protection   to   the   accused   were   unworkable   and
        impractical.  They pointed out the serious  situation  in
        which India was placed now with terrorism threatening its
        security from  all  sides.    They pointed out that today
        India was threatened not only with external terrorism but
        also with internal terrorism.  They submitted that Indian
        Penal Code was  not  conceived  and  was  not  meant  for
        fighting  organised  crime;  that it was designed only to
        check individual crimes and  occasional  riots  at  local
        level.  Organised crime perpetrated by highly trained and
        armed  fanatical elements or mercenaries who are trained,
        financed,  armed  and  supported   by   hostile   foreign
        countries  and  agencies  had to be fought at a different
        level than as an ordinary law  and  order  crime.    They
        pointed out that the anti-terrorism laws of the U.K.  and
        U.S.A.   were  far  more stringent than the provisions of
        the proposed legislation.  They submitted that  the  plea
        that  police was likely to misuse or abuse the provisions
        of the new legislation could not be a ground for opposing
        the very legislation to fight terrorism.  It is one thing
        to say,  they  submitted,  that  the  provisions  of  the
        legislation must be so designed as to prevent or minimise
        its  abuse and misuse and quite another thing to say that
        because of the possibility of abuse, no such  law  should
        be enacted  at  all.    For  that matter, they submitted,
        there was no Act on  the  statute  book  either  in  this
        country  or  anywhere else which was not open to abuse or
        misuse.   Even  provisions  of  the  Code   of   Criminal
        Procedure  or the Indian Penal code were liable to misuse
        but that could not be a ground for asking for the  repeal
        of those  enactments.    They  submitted  that  one  must
        realise  the  extraordinary,   alarming   and   dangerous
        situation  in  which the country was placed today because
        of the  activities  of  the  hostile  neighbour  and  the
        fundamentalist  Islamic  terrorism  which have made India
        their prime  target.    They  pointed  out  that  foreign
        terrorists  now  far  outnumbered the local terrorists in
        Jammu and Kashmir and that thousands more were waiting to
        enter J&K with  a  view  to  carrying  on  the  so-called
        `Jehad'.   In  such a situation, any delay or inaction on
        the part of the country to take measures to  fight  these
        terrorist  elements  would be a grave dereliction of duty
        on the part of the State.  The present enactment was  but
        one  of the means of fighting terrorism and therefore its
        enactment could not validly be opposed.
         Shri Justice J.S.  Verma,  Chairperson,  National
        Human  Rights  Commission,  while  inaugurating the first
        seminar, opined that having regard to  the  extraordinary
        situation  obtaining  in  the  country and in view of the
        steadily worsening situation  in  certain  parts  of  the
        country,  a  special law was necessary to fight terrorist
        activities.  At the same time, he suggested that the  Act
        must  contain  necessary  safeguards  and  it  must  be a
        legislation with  a  human  face.     He   stressed   the
        importance  of  maintaining  a balance between individual
        rights and the rights of the society and opined  that  in
        case of conflict between the two, the interest of society
        must prevail.      Justice   Verma  referred  to  several
        decisions  of  the  Supreme  Court  rendered  under  TADA
        including  the decisions in Kartar Singh, Sanjay Dutt and
        Shaheen Welfare Society and suggested  that  the  several
        guidelines  available in those decisions might be kept in
        mind while enacting the new  legislation.    The  learned
        judge  also  referred  to the Armed Forces Special Powers
        Act and stated that its constitutionality had been upheld
        by a  Constitution  Bench  of  the  Supreme  Court  while
        reading  certain  constitutional safeguards into the Act.
        He pointed out the long pendency of cases under TADA  and
        the  adverse  image  of  India  it  was  creating  in the
        international arena.  He suggested that the  Preamble  to
        the  Constitution  and  the  guarantees contained therein
        should be kept in mind and that in the matter of bail,  a
        classification  of cases may be provided for on the lines
        indicated in the of decision in  Shaheen  Welfare.    The
        learned  judge  also  stressed  the  importance of speedy
        trial.  If bail was not granted and the  trial  was  also
        not  proceeded  with  reasonable  promptitude, it becomes
        oppressive, the learned judge stated.  Six months  should
        be the  time  limit for a trial to conclude.  The learned
        judge also affirmed the correctness of the argument  that
        the  mere  possibility of abuse could not be a ground for
        the very enactment of such a legislation.  On  the  other
        hand, the learned judge pointed out that effort should be
        made  to  try  to find out how best to prevent the misuse
        and abuse of the provisions of such a legislation.    The
        learned  judge then referred to the experience under TADA
        and suggested that investing  powers  under  the  Act  in
        higher  authorities  was an effective means of preventing
        its misuse.  He also referred to the  experiment  of  the
        Review Committees and to the desirability of plurality in
        the composition   of   the  reviewing  authorities.    He
        concluded his inaugural speech by  observing  that  while
        the  legislation  was necessary, it was equally important
        to incorporate provisions to prevent its misuse.  He also
        suggested  that  the  authorities  found   misusing   the
        provisions of the Act, should be sternly dealt with.
         Shri P.P.    Rao,  Senior Advocate, Supreme Court
        and  a  former  President  of  the  Supreme   Court   Bar
        Association  spoke  in  the  same  terms  as Justice J.S.
        Verma.  He welcomed the provisions relating  to  presence
        of  counsel  during  the interrogation of the accused and
        suggested that the power to arrest  or  the  approval  of
        decision  to arrest should be by an authority higher than
        the Superintendent of Police.  In the matter of bail, the
        learned counsel suggested that the  basic  premise  being
        liberty,  the  provisions with respect to bail should not
        be made  too  stringent.     He   also   emphasised   the
        desirability of speedy trial.
         On a consideration of the various viewpoints, the
        Law  Commission  is  of the opinion that a legislation to
        fight terrorism is today a necessity in India.  It is not
        as if the enactment of such a legislation would by itself
        subdue terrorism.  It may,  however,  arm  the  State  to
        fight terrorism more effectively.  There is a good amount
        of substance in the submission that the Indian Penal Code
        (IPC)  was  not  designed  to fight or to check organised
        crime of the nature we are faced with now.    Here  is  a
        case  of  organised groups or gangs trained, inspired and
        supported by  fundamentalists  and  anti-Indian  elements
        trying  to  destablise  the country who make no secret of
        their intentions.  The  act  of  terrorism  by  its  very
        nature generates terror and a psychosis of fear among the
        populace.  Because of the terror and the fear, people are
        rendered sullen.   They become helpless spectators of the
        atrocities committed before their eyes.  They are  afraid
        of   contacting   the   Police   authorities   about  any
        information they may have about terrorist activities much
        less  to  cooperate  with  the  Police  in  dealing  with
        terrorists.  It is difficult to get any witnesses because
        people are afraid of their own safety and safety of their
        families.  It is well known that during the worst days in
        Punjab, even the judges and prosecutors were gripped with
        such  fear  and terror that they were not prepared to try
        or prosecute the cases against the terrorists.   That  is
        also  stated  to be the position today in J&K and this is
        one reason which is contributing to the enormous delay in
        going on with the trials against the terrorists.  In such
        a  situation,  insisting  upon  independent  evidence  or
        applying  the  normal  peace-time  standards  of criminal
        prosecution, may be impracticable.  It  is  necessary  to
        have a  special law to deal with a special situation.  An
        extraordinary situation calls for an  extraordinary  law,
        designed  to meet and check such extraordinary situation.
        It is one thing to say that we must  create  and  provide
        internal structures and safeguards against possible abuse
        and misuse of the Act and altogether a different thing to
        say  that  because  the  law  is liable to be misused, we
        should not have such an Act at all.   The  Supreme  Court
        has  repeatedly  held  that  mere  possibility  of  abuse
        cannnot be a ground for denying the vesting of powers  or
        for declaring  a  statute  unconstitutional.  In State of
        Rajasthan v.  Union  of  India  (1978  1  SCR  p.1),  the
        Supreme Court observed "it must be remembered that merely
        because  power  may  sometimes be abused, it is no ground
        for denying the existence of power.  The  wisdom  of  man
        has  not  yet  been able to conceive of a government with
        power sufficient to answer all its legitimate  needs  and
        at  the  same  time  incapable of mischief" (at page 77).
        Similarly, in Collector of Customs v.  Nathella  Sampathu
        Chetty  (AIR  1962  SC  316),  the  Court  observed, "The
        possibility of abuse of a statute  otherwise  valid  does
        not impart   to  it  any  element  of  invalidity".    In
        Kesavananda Bharati v.  State of Kerala  (1973  Supp  SCR
        p.1), Khanna J.    observed  as follows at page 755:  "In
        exercising the  power  of  judicial  review,  the  Courts
        cannot  be  oblivious  of  the  practical  needs  of  the
        government.  The door has to be left open for  trial  and
        error.  Constitutional law like other mortal contrivances
        has to  take  some  chances.  Opportunity must be allowed
        for vindicating reasonable belief by experience." To  the
        same effect  are observations of Krishna Iyer J.  in T.N.
        Education Department v.  State of Tamilnadu (1980  1  SCR
        1026 at 1031)   and   Commissioner   H.R.E.     v.    Sri
        Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt (AIR  1954
        SC 282).    All  these  decisions  were  referred  to and
        followed by a recent  nine-Judge  Constitution  Bench  in
        Mafatlal Industries  v.    Union  of  India [1997 (5) SCC
         With  respect  to  the  plea  that  even  if   an
        anti-terrorism  law is made, it should not be a permanent
        enactment, we must say that this  objection  is  academic
        since  the  Bill,  as drafted by the Government read with
        the Official Amendments,  speaks  of  only  a  five  year
        duration  for  the  proposed  legislation,  which feature
        remains unchanged.
                               CHAPTER IV            
         Part I contains  only  two  clauses.    Clause  1
        provides for the title and the extent of the Act.  In our
        opinion  the  short  title  of  the  Bill  should  be the
        Prevention of Terrorism Bill, 2000.
         Sub-clause (2) and sub-clause (3) as proposed  by
        the  Official  Amendments,  in  our  opinion, requires no
         Clause 2 defines certain expressions occurring in
        the Bill.  In the original Bill,  there  were  only  five
        definitions  with  the residuary clause saying that words
        and expressions used but not  defined  in  this  Act  and
        defined in the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.) shall
        have  the  meanings  respectively assigned to them in the
        Code.  We propose to define under  clause  (b)  the  term
        `proceeds  of  terrorism'  as  explained  under paragraph
        5.13.3 of the Working Paper (Annexure I).    By  Official
        Amendments, however, two new definitions are sought to be
        introduced,  namely,  the  definition of "High Court" and
        "Public Prosecutor" by way of paragraphs (ba)  and  (ca).
        With  respect  to  the definition of the expression "High
        Court", it was pointed out in our Working Paper that  the
        purpose behind  this  definition  was  not clear.  It was
        pointed  out  that  if  the  intention  behind  the  said
        definition  was  to empower a judge of a special court to
        continue to try a matter which he may have been trying as
        a special judge, even after his elevation to High  Court,
        then  it  would  be  appropriate to provide expressly for
        such a situation.  If that  is  not  the  intention,  the
        definition is unnecessary inasmuch as the said expression
        is already defined by clause (e) of section 2 of the Code
        of Criminal  Procedure.   We have been unable to find any
        provision in the Bill which says  that  a  special  judge
        trying  a  particular  case shall continue to try it till
        its conclusion even if he is elevated to the  High  Court
        in the  midst  of  a  trial.  According to us, therefore,
        either  the  said  definition  be  dropped  or   may   be
        appropriately defined to achieve the intention underlying
         So far as the new definition of public prosecutor
        is concerned, we have nothing to add.
         Part  two  of  the  Bill contains clauses 3 to 7.
        Clause 3 defines the expression "terrorist act" and  also
        provides   for   punishment  therefor  and  other  allied
        provisions.  It  contains   six   sub-clauses.      While
        sub-clause   (1)   defines   terrorism,   sub-clause  (2)
        prescribes  the  punishment  for  terrorist   activities.
        Sub-clause  (3)  punishes  those  conspiring, attempting,
        advocating, abetting,  advising,  inciting  or  knowingly
        facilitating   the   commission   of   a  terrorist  act.
        Sub-clause (4) deals with  those  who  knowingly  harbour
        terrorists  while  sub-clause (5) punishes the members of
        terrorist gangs  and  organisations.     Sub-clause   (6)
        declares the holding of proceeds of terrorism illegal.
         Clause 3:    The  Official  Amendments propose to
        substitute the opening words in sub-clause (1) of  clause
        3.  In place of the words "whoever with intent to overawe
        the  government as by law established or to strike terror
        in the people or any section of the people or to alienate
        any section of the people  or  to  adversely  affect  the
        harmony  amongst different sections of the people, does",
        the following words "whoever with intent to threaten  the
        unity,  integrity, security or sovereignty of India or to
        strike terror in the people or any section of the people,
        does" are  proposed  to  be  substituted.    A  criticism
        levelled  against the substituted definition was that any
        person questioning the unity and integrity of the country
        was sought to be branded as a terrorist.  It was  pointed
        out  that  if  a person honestly believed and said that a
        particular  part  of   the   country   should   be   made
        independent,   he  would  come  within  the  mischief  of
        sub-clause (1) of clause 3.  We do not  think  that  this
        criticism or  apprehension is well founded.  A reading of
        sub-clause (1) makes it clear that merely threatening the
        unity or integrity of India is not by  itself  sufficient
        to attract  the  offence  in  that  sub-clause.   What is
        necessary is that the person  who  threatens  the  unity,
        integrity,  security or sovereignty of India also does an
        act or thing by using bombs, dynamite, etc.  in a  manner
        which  causes  or is likely to cause death of or injuries
        to any person or persons or  loss  of  or  damage  to  or
        destruction  of property or disruption of any supplies or
        services essential  to  the  life  of  the  community  or
        detains  any person and threatens to kill and injure such
        person in order to compel the  government  or  any  other
        person to  do  or  abstain from doing any act.  These are
        serious matters and the apprehension of those opposed  to
        this provision is unfounded.
         In  paras  5.3  and 5.4 of the Working Paper, the
        Law Commission had suggested the retention of  the  words
        "to overawe  the  government as by law established".  The
        said suggestion was made in view of the fact that no good
        reason can be  found  for  deleting  the  said  words  as
        proposed in  the  official  amendments.  These words were
        there in the original draft of the Bill and also  in  the
        TADA.   On  a consideration of the entire material placed
        before us, we are inclined to drop  this  proposal  since
        the  element of "overawing the government" can be said to
        be implicit in the sub-clause as modified/amended by  the
        official amendments.
         So far as the Law Commission's proposal to retain
        the words "or to alienate any section of the people or to
        adversely  affect  the harmony amongst different sections
        of  the  people"  in  sub-clause  (1)  of  clause  3   is
        concerned,  we  are  dropping it also for the reason that
        the said words do not appear to fit into the  sub-section
        once  its  direction  is oriented towards threatening the
        unity, integrity, security or sovereignty of India.
         The Law Commission has observed in para 5.6  that
        crimes   in   the   field  of  electronics/computers  are
        increasingly  being  used  for  international  terrorism.
        Reference   was   made   to   section  805  of  the  U.S.
        Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act  of  1996,
        which  provides  deterrent  sentence  for  any  terrorist
        activity damaging  a  federal  interest  computer.     In
        chapter  three,  the  Commission  had  also  referred  to
        section 701 of the U.S.  Act which  defines  the  federal
        crime  of  terrorism,  which  is of very wide application
        taking in  all  violations  of  enactments  dealing  with
        aircraft, airports, biological weapons, nuclear material,
        destruction    of    government    properties   including
        communication lines, stations and systems and so  on  and
        so forth.   The Law Commission is of the opinion that any
        damage to equipment  installed  or  utilised  for  or  in
        connection  with defence or for any other purposes of the
        government is equally an act of terrorism if it  is  done
        with  intent  to threaten the unity, integrity, security,
        sovereignty of India.  We are, therefore, of the  opinion
        that  after  the words "supplies or services essential to
        the life of the community", the following  words  may  be
        added "or causes damage to or destruction of any property
        or  equipment used or intended to be used for the defence
        of India or in connection  with  any  other  purposes  of
        Government of  India or any of its agencies".  Sub-clause
        (1), may therefore  be  recast  incorporating  the  above
         It would be seen that the definition of terrorist
        act  in  our  Bill  is  put  into  one  sub-clause  viz.,
        sub-clause (1) of clause 3, whereas the U.K.  legislation
        defines "terrorism"  in  section  1  and  "terrorist"  in
        section 38  in  more  extensive terms.  The definition of
        "terrorist" in the U.K.  Act speaks of a person  who  has
        committed an offence under any of the sections 10, 11, 14
        to 17, 52 and 54 to 56 of that Act.  Sections 10 to 17 of
        U.K.   Act  deal with helping, raising funds or otherwise
        having connections with proscribed  organisations,  while
        section  52  and  54  to  56  speak  of weapons training,
        directing terrorist organisations and  possession  of  an
        article   for   the   purpose  connected  with  terrorist
        activities.  It would be appropriate  that  our  Act  too
        contains provisions which make the membership of a banned
        organisation   and/or  raising  funds  for  or  otherwise
        furthering  the  activities  of  banned  organisation,  a
        terrorist act.     Similarly,  possession  of  unlicensed
        firearms  and  explosives  and  other  weapons  of   mass
        destruction  (in  the notified areas) may also be treated
        as an act of terrorism.  Indeed, section 5  of  TADA  did
        make  possession  of  arms and ammunition in the notified
        areas punishable offence.  We, therefore, recommend  that
        existing  sub-clause (1) may be numbered as paragraph (a)
        of sub-clause (1) and a new  paragraph  (b)  be  inserted
        therein.  Sub-clause (1) will read as follows:-
         "3.  (1) Whoever,
         (a) with intent to threaten the unity, integrity,
                security  or  sovereignty  of  India or to strike
                terror in the people or any section of the people
                does any act or thing by using bombs, dynamite or
                other   explosive   substances   or   inflammable
                substances  or  fire-arms or other lethal weapons
                or poisons or noxious gases or other chemicals or
                by any other substances  (whether  biological  or
                otherwise) of a hazardous nature in such a manner
                as  to cause, or as is likely to cause, death of,
                or injuries to, any person or persons or loss of,
                or damage to,  or  destruction  of,  property  or
                disruption  of any supplies or services essential
                to the life of the community or causes damage  to
                or  destruction of any property or equipment used
                or intended to be used for the defence  of  India
                or  in  connection with any other purposes of the
                Government of India, any State Government or  any
                of  their  agencies,  or  detains  any person and
                threatens to kill or injure such person in  order
                to  compel  the Government or any other person to
                do or abstain from doing any act,
         (b)  is  or  continues  to  be  a  member  of  an
                association  declared unlawful under the Unlawful
                Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 or  voluntarily
                does an act aiding or promoting in any manner the
                objects  of  such an association and is either in
                possession of any unlicenced firearm, ammunition,
                explosive  or  other  instrument   or   substance
                capable  of  causing mass destruction and commits
                any act  resulting  in  loss  of  human  life  or
                grievous   injury   to   any   person  or  causes
                significant damage to any property,
         commits a terrorist act."
         Sub-clause  (2)  of  clause  3  which  speaks  of
        punishment,  in  its  present  language, is comprehensive
        enough to cover both the paragraphs of sub-clause (1) and
        needs no change consequent upon the change in  sub-clause
         The Government may also consider the desirability
        of  introducing  a  new clause - which may be numbered as
        clause 4 - in terms of section 5 of TADA.  The expression
        "notified area" may also be defined in the very clause.
         We may also mention at this stage  that  we  have
        examined  the Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act,
        1999 but find that its focus and objective  is  different
        from the  present  Act.    It is meant to fight organised
        crime which may  not  necessarily  amount  to  `terrorist
        activity'  as  defined  in  sub-clause (1) of clause 3 of
        this Bill, though in some cases they may overlap.  We  do
        not,  therefore,  think  it  necessary  to  deal with the
        definitions of "continuing unlawful activity", "organised
        crime" and "organised crime syndicate" occurring  in  the
        Maharashtra Act.  So far as certain procedural provisions
        contained  in the Maharashtra Act are concerned, they are
        referred to hereinafter at relevant places.
         Sub-clauses  (2)  and  (3)  do  not  require  any
         Sub-clause  (4)  seeks  to  punish  a  person who
        "harbours or conceals or attempts to harbour  or  conceal
        any person knowingly that such person is a terrorist" (as
        proposed to be amended by "official" amendments).  It was
        pointed  out  by certain participants at the seminar that
        this sub-section, as it stood now, would also take in the
        mother, father, sister or brother of a terrorist who came
        home to hide himself and that it would be  wholly  unjust
        to  punish  such relative of the terrorist merely because
        he was allowed to stay in the house by such  a  relative.
        It  was  also pointed out by some other participants that
        such harbouring or concealing might be  out  of  fear  or
        under the  threat  of violence by the terrorists.  It was
        pointed out that in such a situation, the person supposed
        to be harbouring or concealing a terrorist was himself  a
        victim.   On  the  other hand, certain other participants
        pointed out that the terrorists should  not  be  provided
        any  sanctuary  and  that  any  person  who  harboured or
        concealed a terrorist knowing that he  was  a  terrorist,
        should  be  held  guilty of the offence under sub-section
        (4).  On a consideration of the rival submissions, we are
        of the opinion that it would be appropriate  to  add  the
        word  "voluntarily"  after  the word "whoever" and before
        the words "harbours or conceals".  This would  exclude  a
        situation  where  a  person  harbours  a  terrorist under
        threat or coercion even though he  may  be  knowing  that
        that person  is  a terrorist.  So far as the wife/husband
        harbouring  the  terrorist  is  concerned,  we  recommend
        addition of an Exception in terms of Exception to section
        212 of I.P.C.  to read:
         "Exception.-  This sub-section shall not apply to
        any case in which the harbour or concealment  is  by  the
        husband or wife of the offender".
         We are also of the opinion that there should be a
        slight  change  in the minimum punishment provided by the
        sub-clause.   Keeping  in  view  of  the  provisions   of
        sub-clause  (2) as well as sub-clause (3) of clause 3, it
        would be appropriate to reduce the minimum punishment  to
        three years from five years.
         Sub-clause (5)  requires  no  change.   So far as
        sub-clause (6) is concerned, it is dealt with at a  later
         In  para  5.9  of  its  Working  Paper,  the  Law
        Commission had recommended addition of sub-clause (7)  in
        clause 3 in the following terms:
         "(7)  Whoever  threatens  any  person  who  is  a
                witness or any other person in whom such  witness
                may  be  interested, with violence, or wrongfully
                restrains or confines the witness, or  any  other
                person  in whom the witness may be interested, or
                does any other unlawful act with the said intent,
                shall be punishable with imprisonment  which  may
                extend to three years and fine."
         During  the seminars or in the responses received
        by us pursuant to the Working  Paper,  no  objection  was
        taken   to   this   proposal   except   in   the  written
        representation  from   the   South   Asia   Human   Right
        Documentation Centre  (SAHRDC).  We however see no reason
        to drop this proposal which is considered to  be  in  the
        interest of  a  free  and  fair trial.  Sub-clause (7) as
        recommended above, should therefore  be  incorporated  in
        clause 3.
         In  para  5.10  of  the  Working  Paper,  the Law
        Commission had also proposed addition of  sub-clause  (8)
        placing  an  obligation  upon the persons receiving or in
        possession of information as to any terrorist activity to
        inform the Police as soon as practicable.  It may be that
        when terror prevails, people may be  afraid  of  speaking
        out.   As  a  matter of fact, one of the prime objects of
        creating terror is to silence the people by instilling  a
        psychosis of  fear  in  them.  At the same time it cannot
        also be forgotten that  such  an  obligation  has  to  be
        placed  upon the citizens of this country for effectively
        fighting the terrorism.   The  incorporation  of  such  a
        sub-clause  does  not  mean  that any or every person not
        giving information would necessarily be punished.  If and
        when a person is prosecuted under the proposed sub-clause
        (8), the court  will  take  into  consideration  all  the
        relevant  facts  and  circumstances  and even where he is
        punished, the quantum of punishment to be  awarded  would
        be within  the discretion of the court.  It may even be a
        mere fine and that too of a small amount.
         At  the  two  seminars  and  in   the   responses
        received, an objection was raised that this would take in
        even a journalist/media person who interviews a terrorist
        and  he  would  be  obliged  to  disclose the information
        relating to the terrorist interviewed  by  him  and  that
        therefore  this  provision  is  not  consistent  with the
        freedom of Press and media.  It may,  however,  be  noted
        that in India, freedom of Press flows from sub-clause (a)
        of  clause (1) of Article 19 of the Constitution of India
        and it has been repeatedly held by our Supreme Court that
        rights and privileges of the Press are  no  greater  than
        that of  any  of  the  citizens of India.  Even in UK and
        USA,  no  immunity  in  favour  of  journalists/Press  is
        recognised  which  would  be  evident  from the following
        statement of Law at page 203 of D.D.   Basu's  commentary
        "Law of the Press" (Third Edition).
         "The  same view, as in UK, has been arrived at by
        the American Supreme Court, recently,  holding  that  the
        guarantee  of  freedom of the Press does not immunise the
        Press to render assistance to the investigation of crimes
        which obligation  lies  on  every  citizen.    They  are,
        accordingly,  bound  to disclose the information gathered
        by journalists, with  their  sources,  even  though  such
        information may have been obtained under an agreement not
        to disclose, provided such information is relevant to the
        investigation,  in  a  particular  case, and they are not
        compelled to disclose more than  is  necessary  for  such
         We  are  accordingly  of  the  opinion that a new
        sub-clause (8)  should  be  added  in  clause  3  to  the
        following effect:
         "(8)    A  person  receiving  or in possession of
                information which he knows or believes  might  be
                of material assistance -
         (i)     in preventing the commission by any other
                person of a terrorist act; or
         (ii)    in securing the apprehension, prosecution
                or  conviction of any other person for an offence
                involving   the   commission,   preparation    or
                instigation of such an act,
         and  fails, without reasonable cause, to disclose
                that   information   as   soon   as    reasonably
                practicable to the police, shall be punished with
                imprisonment  for  a term which may extend to one
                year or fine or both."
        Clause 4:        Clause  4  provides  for  punishment  for
        disruptive activities.   The clause occurring in Criminal
        Law Amendment Bill is proposed to be substituted  in  its
        entirety by   the   Official   Amendments.     We  shall,
        therefore,  deal  with  clause  4  as  contained  in  the
        official amendments.
         Sub-clause  (1) of that clause says that "whoever
        questions, disrupts, whether directly or indirectly,  the
        sovereignty or territorial integrity of India or supports
        any  claim whether directly or indirectly for the cession
        of any other part of India or secession of  any  part  of
        India from  the  Union,  commits  a disruptive act".  The
        Explanation  appended  to  sub-clause  (1)  defines   the
        expressions "cession"  and "secession".  Paragraph (c) of
        the Explanation, however, excludes "trade union  activity
        or  other  mass  movement  without the use of violence or
        questioning the sovereignty or territorial  integrity  of
        India  or supporting any claim for cession of any part of
        India or secession of any part of India" from the purview
        of sub-clause (1).  Sub-clause (2) seeks to punish  those
        who  commit,  conspire  or  attempt  to  commit  or abet,
        advocate, advise or knowingly facilitate  the  commission
        of  any  disruptive  act  or any act preparatory thereto.
        Sub-clause (3) seeks to expand the  scope  of  disruptive
        activity.   According  to  this  sub-clause,  "any action
        taken whether by act or by speech or  through  any  other
        media  or  in  any  other  manner  whatsoever,  which (a)
        advocates, advises, suggests or incites or (b)  predicts,
        prophesies  or pronounces or otherwise expresses, in such
        manner as  to  incite,  advise,  suggest  or  prompt  the
        killing  or  the  destruction  of  any person bound by or
        under the Constitution  to  uphold  the  sovereignty  and
        integrity  of  India  or  any  public servant" amounts to
        disruptive activity.  Sub-clause (4) provides  punishment
        for persons  who  knowingly  harbour  a disruptionist.  A
        reading of clause 4 shows that it seeks to punish speech.
        Though sub-clause (3) uses the expression "act", it again
        appears to be confined to an act of speech.    Shri  K.G.
        Kannabiran, Shri  H.D.    Shourie  and  some  others have
        suggested segregation of offences relating to  disruptive
        activities  from  the  provisions  of  the anti-terrorism
         In  our  opinion,  inclusion  of  mere  offensive
        speech  in  this  Bill  is  liable to be termed a case of
        over-reaction and a disproportionate response.    We  are
        not  suggesting  that such speech is either valid or that
        such speech should not be made punishable.  All  that  we
        are  suggesting  is  that  such  speech or its punishment
        should not find place in  an  anti-terrorism  law.    We,
        therefore,  recommend that clause 4 be deleted altogether
        from the Bill or it may be redrafted so  as  to  take  in
        physical  acts  directed towards disturbing the integrity
        or sovereignty of India so as to take in acts other  than
        those mentioned  in  clause 3.  Mere offensive speech may
        be dealt with by another enactment - may be  by  amending
        the Indian  Penal  Code.    This  is  a  matter  for  the
        government to decide.
        Clause 5:        We have no comments to offer with respect
        to clause 5.
        Clauses 6 & 7:   Clauses 6 and 7 of the Bill, as  prepared
        by   the  Government,  read  together,  provide  for  the
        (a)      If an officer investigating an offence under  the
        Act has reasons to believe that "any property in relation
        to which an investigation is being conducted" is property
        derived  from terrorist activity and includes proceeds of
        terrorism, he  shall  seize/attach  that  property  after
        making  an  order in that regard so that such property is
        not transferred or otherwise dealt with except  with  his
        permission  or  with the permission of the special court.
        The officer seizing/attaching such property has to inform
        the special court of the said fact within 48 hours and it
        shall be open to the court to either  confirm  or  revoke
        the order.
        (b)      It is equally open to the special court trying an
        offence  under this Act to attach properties belonging to
        the accused and where such trial ends in conviction,  the
        property  shall  stand  forfeited  to the government free
        from all encumbrances.
        (c)      Where a person is convicted under  the  Act,  the
        special   court   may,   in   addition  to  awarding  any
        punishment, direct forfeiture of the properties belonging
        to him.
        (d)      If the property forfeited represents shares in  a
        company,   the   company  shall  forthwith  register  the
        government as the transferee of such shares.
         The Law Commission had suggested in  its  Working
        Paper  that  in  addition  to the provisions contained in
        clauses 6 and 7, there should  be  a  parallel  procedure
        providing  for  forfeiture/confiscation  of  proceeds  of
        terrorism.  The expression "proceeds  of  terrorism"  was
        defined  to mean "all kinds of properties which have been
        derived or obtained from commission of any terrorist  act
        or disruptive activity or has been acquired through funds
        traceable to  terrorist  act or disruptive activity".  It
        was also proposed in the Working Paper that there  should
        be  a  specific section declaring the holding of proceeds
        of terrorism itself as illegal and  providing  for  their
        confiscation.   It  was  suggested  that  there should be
        provisions  prescribing  the  procedure  following  which
        proceeds   of   terrorism   can  be  seized/attached  and
        forfeited to the government.  It was clarified  that  for
        this  purpose it is not necessary that the person holding
        such proceeds or owning such proceeds or in possession of
        such proceeds should have been prosecuted under the Act.     
         The object behind the provision has been to reach
        the properties of the terrorists, who, for some reason or
        other cannot be arrested or prosecuted including for  the
        reason that  they are safely ensconced abroad.  Reference
        was made to the fact that certain persons are said to  be
        directing,   controlling   and   carrying   on  terrorist
        activities  within  India  while  stationed  outside  the
        country.    It   was   pointed  out  that  attaching  and
        forfeiting the  properties  belonging  to  such  persons,
        irrespective  of  the  fact  in  whose  name and in whose
        possession they were held, would be an effective  way  of
        fighting terrorism.      It   was   suggested  that  such
        attachment could be made only by an officer not below the
        rank of Superintendent  of  Police  and  that  he  should
        inform  the  special  court  of  such  seizure/attachment
        within 48 hours.
         It was further provided that it shall be open  to
        the  officer  seizing/attaching  the properties to either
        produce them before the court  where  the  person  owning
        such properties is prosecuted under the Act or to produce
        the  same  before  the designated authority (who shall be
        distinct from a  designated  court).    If  the  property
        seized/attached   is   produced   before  the  designated
        authority, he shall issue a notice to the person in whose
        name it is standing  or  in  whose  possession  they  are
        found, to show cause as to why the said properties should
        not  be  declared  to  be  the  proceeds of terrorism and
        forfeited/confiscated in favour of the  government.    It
        was  further  provided  that  in  such  a proceeding, the
        burden shall lie upon the person  to  whom  a  notice  is
        issued  to establish that the properties mentioned in the
        show cause notice  do  not  represent  the  "proceeds  of
        terrorism"  or  that  they  were earned by legitimate and
        lawful means.  After making  appropriate  inquiry  (which
        would  naturally  involve  an  inquiry into facts in case
        there is a dispute as to facts), the Designated Authority
        shall pass final orders either forfeiting  such  property
        in  favour  of the government or releasing it as the case
        may be.  Detailed procedure on the lines of the procedure
        contained in SAFEMA  (whose  constitutionality  has  been
        upheld  by a nine-judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme
        Court) was provided.  The only objection which  has  been
        put forward in the course of seminars to these provisions
        is that the power to forfeit the properties should not be
        vested  in  administrative  authority like the Designated
        Authority but that it should vest in a court or a special
        court, as the case may be.  Though it cannot be said that
        the said objection is totally without any  substance,  it
        is  necessary to mention at the same time that even under
        SAFEMA,  the  power  to   forfeit   is   vested   in   an
        administrative officer   and   not  in  a  court.    More
        important - though the Designated  Authority  may  be  an
        administrative officer, once he is designated as a
        Designated  Authority,  he  becomes  a  tribunal  for all
        purposes and would be obliged to observe  the  principles
        of  natural  justice  while  making the inquiry and while
        passing the final orders.  In fact, an appeal is provided
        from the orders of the Designated Authority to  the  High
        Court directly.    In  such  a situation, there can be no
        room for any  valid  apprehension  that  the  proceedings
        under this parallel procedure would result in miscarriage
        of justice.   Accordingly, we reiterate our proposals and
        recommend that provisions and modifications suggested  in
        para 5.13.3  should  be  incorporated  in the Bill.  They
        read as follows:
         "6.     Holding of proceeds of terrorism illegal:
                (1) No person shall hold or be in  possession  of
                any proceeds  of  terrorism.    (2)  Proceeds  of
                terrorism, whether they are held by  a  terrorist
                or  by  any  other person and whether or not such
                person is prosecuted or convicted under this  Act
                shall  be  liable  to be forfeited to the Central
                Government in the manner hereinafter provided.
         6A.     Powers of investigating officers:  (1) If
                an officer (not below the rank of  Superintendent
                of  Police)  investigating  an  offence committed
                under this Act has reason  to  believe  that  any
                property in relation to which an investigation is
                being conducted is a property derived or obtained
                from  the  commission  of  any  terrorist  act or
                represents proceeds of terrorism, he shall,  with
                the  prior  approval  in  writing of the Director
                General of the Police of the State in which  such
                property  is situated, make an order seizing such
                property and where it is not practicable to seize
                such  property,  make  an  order  of   attachment
                directing   that   such  property  shall  not  be
                transferred or otherwise dealt with  except  with
                the  prior  permission of the officer making such
                order, or of the  Designated  Authority,  or  the
                Special  Court,  as  the case may be, before whom
                the properties seized or attached  are  produced.
                A  copy  of  such  order  shall  be served on the
                person concerned.
         (2)     The  investigating  officer  shall   duly
                inform  the  Designated Authority or, as the case
                may be, the  Special  Court,  within  forty-eight
                hours of the attachment of such property.
         (3)     It   shall  be  open  to  the  Designated
                Authority or the Special Court  before  whom  the
                seized or attached properties are produced either
                to  confirm  or revoke the order of attachment so
         (4)     In  the  case   of   immovable   property
                attached  by  the investigating officer, it shall
                be  deemed  to  have  been  produced  before  the
                Designated Authority or the Special Court, as the
                case  may  be,  when the Investigating Officer so
                notifies in his  report  and  places  it  at  the
                disposal  of  the  Designated  Authority  or  the
                Special Court, as the case may be.
         6B      Forfeiture  of  proceeds  of   terrorism:
                Where  any  property is seized or attached in the
                belief that it constitutes proceeds of  terrorism
                and  is produced before the Designated Authority,
                it  shall,  on  being  satisfied  that  the  said
                property constitutes proceeds of terrorism, order
                forfeiture  of  such property, whether or not the
                person from whose  possession  it  is  seized  or
                attached, is prosecuted in a Special Court for an
                offence under this Act.
         6C      Issue   of   show-cause   notice   before
                forfeiture of proceeds of terrorism:
          (1) No order forfeiting any  proceeds  of
                        terrorism shall be made under section 6B,
                        unless   the   person   holding   or   in
                        possession of such proceeds  is  given  a
                        notice  in  writing  informing him of the
                        grounds  on  which  it  is  proposed   to
                        forfeit  the  proceeds  of  terrorism and
                        such person is given  an  opportunity  of
                        making a representation in writing within
                        such  reasonable time as may be specified
                        in the  notice  against  the  grounds  of
                        forfeiture and is also given a reasonable
                        opportunity of being heard in the matter.
          (2)  No order of forfeiture shall be made
                        under sub-section  (1),  if  such  person
                        establishes   that  he  is  a  bona  fide
                        transferee of  such  proceeds  for  value
                        without   knowing   that  they  represent
                        proceeds of terrorism.
          (3)  It  shall  be   competent   to   the
                        Designated Authority to make an order, in
                        respect  of  property seized or attached,
                        (a) in the case of a perishable  property
                        directing it   to   be  sold:    and  the
                        provisions of section  459  of  the  Code
                        shall,  as  nearly as may be practicable,
                        apply to the net proceeds of such sale;
          (b)  in  the  case  of  other   property,
                        nominating  any  officer  of  the Central
                        Government to perform the function of the
                        Administrator of such property subject to
                        such conditions as may  be  specified  by
                        the Designated Authority.
         6D Appeal:   (1)  Any person aggrieved by an
                        order of forfeiture under section 6B may,
                        within one month from  the  date  of  the
                        communication   to  him  of  such  order,
                        appeal to the  High  Court  within  whose
                        jurisdiction  the  Designated  Authority,
                        who  passed  the  order  to  be  appealed
                        against, is situated.
          (2)  Where  an  order under section 6B is
                        modified or annulled by the High Court or
                        where in a prosecution instituted for the
                        violation of the provisions of this  Act,
                        the  person  against  whom  an  order  of
                        forfeiture has been  made  under  section
                        6B, is acquitted and in either case it is
                        not possible for any reason to return the
                        proceeds  of  terrorism  forfeited,  such
                        person shall be paid the  price  therefor
                        as  if the proceeds of terrorism had been
                        sold  to  the  Central  Government   with
                        reasonable  interest  calculated from the
                        day  of  seizure  of  the   proceeds   of
                        terrorism   and   such   price  shall  be
                        determined in the manner prescribed.
         6E      Order of forfeiture not to interfere with
                other punishments:  The order of forfeiture  made
                under this Act by the Designated Authority, shall
                not   prevent   the   infliction   of  any  other
                punishment to which the person  affected  thereby
                is liable under this Act.
         6F      Claims by  third  parties:  (1) Where any
                claim is preferred, or any objection is  made  to
                the  forfeiture  of any property under section 6C
                on the ground that such property is not liable to
                such forfeiture, the Designated Authority or  the
                Special  Court,  as  the case may be, before whom
                such  property  is  produced,  shall  proceed  to
                investigate the claim or objection.
          Provided that no such investigation shall
                be  made  where  the  Designated Authority or the
                Special  Court  considers  that  the   claim   or
                objection   was  designed  to  cause  unnecessary
         (2)     In case claimant or objector  establishes
                that  the property specified in the notice issued
                under section 6C is not liable to be attached  or
                confiscated  under  the  Act,  the  notice  under
                section  6C  shall  be  withdrawn   or   modified
         6G      Powers of  the Designated Authority:  The
                Designated Authority, acting under the provisions
                of this Act, shall have all the powers of a Civil
                Court required for making a full and fair enquiry
                into the matter before it.
         6H      Obligation to furnish information:    (1)
                Notwithstanding  anything  contained in any other
                law, the officer investigating any offence  under
                this Act, shall have power to require any officer
                or authority of the Central Government or a State
                Government  or  a  local  authority  or a Bank, a
                company,  a  firm  or  any   other   institution,
                establishment,  organisation or any individual to
                furnish  information  in  their   possession   in
                relation to such persons, on points or matters as
                in  the  opinion  of such officer, will be useful
                for, or relevant to, the purposes of this Act.
         (2) Failure to furnish the information called for
                under  sub-section  (1),  or   furnishing   false
                information shall be punishable with imprisonment
                for  a  term which may extend to three years or a
                fine or with both.
         (3)     Notwithstanding anything contained in the
                Code, the offence under sub-section (1) shall  be
                tried   as  a  summary  case  and  the  procedure
                prescribed  in  Chapter  XXI  of  the  said  Code
                [except  sub-section (2) of section 262] shall be
                applicable thereto.
         (4)     Any  officer   in   possession   of   any
                information  may furnish the same suo motu to the
                officer investigating an offence under this  Act,
                if   in   the   opinion   of  such  officer  such
                information will be useful to  the  investigating
                officer for the purposes of this Act.
         6I      Certain  transfers  to  be null and void:
                Where after the issue of an order  under  section
                6A  or issue of a notice under section 6B(1), any
                property  referred  to  in  the  said  notice  is
                transferred by any mode whatsoever, such transfer
                shall,  for  the purpose of the proceedings under
                this Act, be ignored  and  if  such  property  is
                subsequently  confiscated,  the  transfer of such
                property shall be deemed to be null and void."
         The  above  provisions  suggested  by   the   Law
        Commission  are  consistent with sub-clause (6) of clause
        3;  indeed  these  suggested   provisions   advance   the
        objective underlying the said sub-clause.
         Part   III   of   the  Bill  under  consideration
        comprises clauses  8  to  17.    Clause  8   deals   with
        constitution  of Special Courts and the qualifications of
        the persons to be appointed as Judges/Addl.    Judges  of
        the special  courts.    We have nothing to add or comment
        upon this clause.  In the Working Paper also,  no  change
        was suggested   in  this  clause.    Similarly,  the  Law
        Commission has nothing to add to or comment upon clause 9
        (which  deals  with  the  place  of  sitting  of  special
        courts).  Clause 10 of the Bill provides for jurisdiction
        of  Special  Court and transfer of cases from one Special
        Court to any other Special Court  in  another  State,  on
        motion  being  moved  by  the  Attorney-General  of India
        before the Supreme Court.  We are of the opinion that the
        right of applying for transfer should also  be  given  to
        the interested   party   as  fair  play.    We  therefore
        recommend that this clause be  recast  on  the  lines  of
        sections 406  and  407  of Cr.P.C.  Clause 11 again is an
        incidental provision of procedural  nature  to  which  no
        exception can be taken by any one.  It provides that when
        trying an offence, a Special Court may also try any other
        offence  with  which  the  accused may, under the Code of
        Criminal Procedure, be charged at the same trial  if  the
        offence is connected with such other offence.
         By  Amendment 6 of the Official Amendments, a new
        clause, namely, clause 11A is sought  to  be  introduced.
        It contains  two  sub-clauses.   Sub-clause (1) says that
        "when a Police officer investigating a case requests  the
        court  of  a  Chief Judicial Magistrate or the court of a
        Chief Metropolitan Magistrate in  writing  for  obtaining
        samples  of  handwriting,  finger  prints,  foot  prints,
        photographs, blood, saliva, semen, hair  of  any  accused
        person   reasonably  suspected  to  be  involved  in  the
        commission of an offence under  this  Act,  it  shall  be
        lawful  for  the  court of a Chief Judicial Magistrate or
        the court of a Chief Metropolitan  Magistrate  to  direct
        that  such  samples be given by the accused person to the
        Police officer either through a medical  practitioner  or
        otherwise, as the case may be".  Sub-clause (2) then says
        that  "if  any  accused person refuses to give samples as
        provided in sub-clause (1) in a trial under this Act, the
        court shall presume until the contrary is proved that the
        accused person had  committed  such  offence".    In  the
        Working  Paper,  the  Law Commission had observed that in
        view of the decision  of  the  eleven-Judge  Constitution
        Bench  of  the  Supreme  Court  in  State  of  Bombay  v.
        Kathikalu, AIR 1961 SC 1808,  a  direction  of  the  kind
        contemplated  by  sub-clause  (1) of clause 11A cannot be
        held  to  contravene  clause  (3)  of  article  20  which
        declares  that "no person accused of any offence shall be
        compelled to be a witness against himself".  It cannot be
        denied that such a provision is necessary in an enactment
        designed to check terrorist activities.  One must keep in
        mind  the  difficulty  of  procuring  witnesses  and  the
        difficulty  in the way of collecting independent evidence
        against the terrorists.  [In this  connection,  reference
        may  be made to a letter dated February 12, 2000 from Sri
        Veeranna   Aivalli,   Commissioner   of    Security(Civil
        Aviation),  Bureau  of Civil Aviation Security, addressed
        to Law Commission.  He has stated that he has spent  more
        than  three decades in Jammu and Kashmir and on the basis
        of his experience, he has, inter alia, made the following
        comments:  "Our experience of TADA in J&K  has  not  been
        good.   There  has not been a single case, which has been
        decided by  the  Court  of   Law.      The   difficulties
        encountered have been with regard to the non-availability
        of  witnesses  to testify in the Courts of Law on account
        of fear of reprisal.  There  is  another  difficulty  and
        that  is  the  collection  of evidence in cases where the
        search, seizure and arrest in areas  where  there  is  no
        habitation  and  many  a time these have been by security
        forces.  In such a case, the arrested persons' confession
        to the security forces leading to the  recovery  of  arms
        and  ammunition  and  explosives is the only thing, which
        can be brought  on  record.    Even  the  security  force
        personnel  do  not  come  forward  for tendering evidence
        because they keep on  moving  from  place  to  place  for
        performance  of their duties not only within J&K but even
        outside J&K and sometimes outside India.    The  security
        force  personnel  are  reluctant to depose in any case as
        they feel that they are not  attuned  for  this  kind  of
        exercise.   In  the  last  15  years of militancy in J&K,
        thousands of people have been arrested, lakhs of  weapons
        seized  and  millions of rounds collected and quintals of
        explosive material seized.  These figures  are  real  eye
        openers  and the fact that not a single case has ended in
        conviction nor has there been any recording  of  evidence
        and even  this  itself  is  very  disturbing.  TADA had a
        provision that no arrested person could  be  released  on
        bail  without  giving  an  opportunity  to  the  State to
        present its viewpoints.  In thousands of cases, the bails
        were granted in situations far from satisfactory and full
        of suspicion.  The State High Court did not interfere  in
        the  matter on the ground that the appellate jurisdiction
        rested with the Supreme Court.  The Supreme Court did not
        interfere in the matter nor did they take  cognizance  on
        the  ground that no one has filed a petition before it in
        this matter...  The High Court Bar Association had passed
        a resolution that no Member of the Bar should appear  for
        the  State  and  they  wanted  the  judiciary to pass the
        orders ex-parte.  Above facts are only indicators of  the
        malady,  which  has  been prevailing in J&K on account of
        terrorism...  Expression of honest  opinion  have  become
        difficult on account of the damocles sword of contempt of
        court  hanging  on  the  heads  of  the  people..."]  The
        proposed clause 11A provides a legally permissible method
        of collecting  evidence.    It  is  only  one  method  of
        collecting evidence  and proving the offence.  Indeed, if
        the accused is not guilty, such a provision would in fact
        help him in establishing his innocence.   For  the  above
        reasons,  the  insertion  of sub-clause (1) of clause 11A
        cannot be legitimately opposed.  However, we  propose  to
        add the word "voice" after the word "hair" but before the
        words  "of  any accused" in sub-clause (1) so that sample
        of the voice of the accused can be obtained by the police
         Once sub-clause (1) is held to be  necessary  and
        constitutionally valid, no real objection can be taken to
        the  presumption created by sub-clause (2) but it appears
        that   the   amptitude   of   presumption   provided   is
        disproportionate and  excessive.    Instead  of presuming
        that the accused person had committed  such  offence,  it
        would  be  appropriate  and consistent with fair play and
        good sense to provide merely that on  such  failure,  the
        Court   would  draw  the  appropriate  adverse  inference
        against the accused person.
         Clause 12 of the said Bill deals with appointment
        and  qualifications  of   public   prosecutors/additional
        public  prosecutors/special  public  prosecutors  for the
        Special Courts.    No  comment  is  called  for  on  this
         Clause  13  sets  out the procedure and powers of
        Special Courts.   Sub-clause  (1)  empowers  the  Special
        Court  to take cognizance of any offence upon receiving a
        complaint of facts which constitute such offence or  upon
        a  Police  report of such facts without the accused being
        committed to it for trial.  Chapter XVIII of the Code of
        Criminal Procedure provides the procedure to be  followed
        by  the  committal court in case of offences triable by a
        sessions court.  This procedure is dispensed with in  the
        case  of  offences  under  the  Act  by sub-clause (1) of
        clause 13.  Sub-clause (2)  of  clause  13  empowers  the
        special   court   to   try  an  offence  punishable  with
        imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years or with
        fine or with both to try in a summary way  in  accordance
        with the  procedure prescribed by the Code therefor.  The
        two provisos to sub-clause (2) are  enabling  provisions.
        The  minimum  punishment  that  can  be  imposed  in such
        summary trial is however restricted to two years.  We may
        point out that even  according  to  section  260  of  the
        Cr.P.C.,  a magistrate of first class is empowered to try
        offences punishable for two years or less, which can  not
        be  said to be unreasonable, in view of the fact that the
        Special Court is manned by a District Judge.   Sub-clause
        (3)  clarifies  that  a  special court shall have all the
        powers of a court of session while sub-clause  (4)  is  a
        procedural provision to which no valid objection has been
        or can  be  raised.   Sub-clause (5) empowers the special
        court to proceed with the trial in  the  absence  of  the
        accused  or his pleader and to record the evidence of any
        witness, subject to the right of the  accused  to  recall
        the witness   for   cross-examination.    This  power  is
        conferred upon  the  special  court  notwithstanding  the
        provisions  contained  in the Code of Criminal Procedure.
        However, before exercising this power, the Special  Court
        has to be satisfied that such a course is appropriate and
        is also obliged to record the reasons for adopting such a
        course.   Not  only  no  objection has been taken to this
        sub-clause  by  anyone,  the  incorporation  of  such   a
        provision in an anti-terrorism law, is obviously designed
        in  the  interest  of  speedy  trial  and hence cannot be
        reasonably objected to.   However,  it  does  not  appear
        necessary  to  exclude  section  299  of  the  CrPC which
        provides for   a   special   situation.      Accordingly,
        sub-clause  needs modification to make it clear that that
        section 299 is not excluded.
         Clause 14 of the  Bill  contains  provisions  for
        protection of   witnesses.    Sub-clause  (1)  says  that
        notwithstanding  anything  contained  in  the   Code   of
        Criminal  Procedure, the proceedings under the Act may be
        held in camera if the Special Court so desires.   It  may
        not  be fair to leave this discretion totally unregulated
        or unguided.  It would be fair and proper to provide that
        the Special Court shall record its  reasons  for  holding
        the trial  in  camera.    Sub-clause has accordingly been
        modified.  Sub-clause (2) empowers the special  court  to
        take  appropriate  measures  for keeping the identity and
        address of a witness secret if it is satisfied  that  the
        life  of  a  witness  in  any proceedings before it is in
        danger.  Of course, the court has to record  the  reasons
        for taking  such  measures.   This power can be exercised
        either on the application made by the witness or  by  the
        public prosecutor  or suo motu.  Sub-clause (3) of clause
        14  specifies  some  of  the  measures  contemplated   by
        sub-clause (2).    The  measures specified in sub-section
        (3) are (a) holding of the proceedings at a place  to  be
        decided by the special court; (b) avoiding of the mention
        of the names and addresses of the witnesses in its orders
        or  judgments or in any records of the case accessible to
        public; (c) issuing of any direction  for  securing  that
        the  identity  and  addresses  of  the  witnesses are not
        disclosed and (d) passing orders to the effect that it is
        in the public interest that all or any of the proceedings
        pending before such a court shall not be published in any
        manner.  In para 5.15  of  its  Working  Paper,  the  Law
        Commission  had  opined  that while it may be necessay to
        protect the witness by keeping his identity  and  address
        secret,  the  right  of the accused to cross-examine such
        witness must also be protected at the same time.  It  was
        observed  that  there  may  be  several  methods by which
        effective  cross-examination  could  yet  be   undertaken
        without  disclosing  the  identity  and  address  of  the
        witness.  Accordingly, it was  suggested  that  paragraph
        (c)  of sub-clause (3) of clause 14 may be substituted by
        the following:
         "(c) The making  of  necessary  arrangements  for
                securing  that  the  identity  and address of the
                witness  is  not  disclosed   even   during   his
         At the seminars, two conflicting view points were
        projected.   One  set  of  participants submitted that no
        effective  cross-examination  was  possible  unless   the
        identity  of the witness was known to the accused and his
        counsel and that therefore concealing the identity of the
        witness would really  mean  denying  to  the  accused  an
        effective opportunity  to cross-examine the witness.  The
        proponents of this view emphasised the absolute necessity
        of affording to the accused a reasonable  opportunity  to
        cross-examine the  witness.    On the other hand, certain
        other participants stressed the necessity  of  concealing
        the  identity  of  the  witness  from the accused and his
        counsel in cases where such a course  was  necessary  for
        protecting  the  life  or  safety  of the witness and his
        relatives.  They also emphasised the practical difficulty
        in procuring witnesses in such matters and submitted that
        if a person yet came forward as a witness but apprehended
        danger to his life on that account, it was  the  duty  of
        the court and the State to provide him protection.
         We  have  considered  both  the  points  of view.
        Sub-clause (3) is indeed illustrative  of  the  provision
        contained in  sub-clause (2).  In other words, sub-clause
        (3) is not an independent provision  but  a  continuation
        and elaboration  of  sub-clause  (2).    This  means that
        before taking any of the steps elaborated  in  sub-clause
        (3),  the special court has to be satisfied that the life
        of a particular witness is in danger and must also record
        reasons for  formation  of  such   satisfaction.      The
        requirement  of law that the court must be satisfied that
        the life of the witness was in  danger  and  the  further
        requirement that the special court is bound to record its
        reasons   for  forming  such  satisfaction  are  adequate
        safeguards  against  abuse  of  the  power  conferred  by
        sub-clause (2) upon the special court.  Sub-clause (2) is
        based  upon the doctrine of necessity, a cruel necessity.
        It obviously takes note of the  fact  that  the  life  of
        witnesses deposing against terrorists may be in danger in
        many cases  and  provides for such cases.  Sub-clause (2)
        which in reality includes sub-clause (3) within its fold,
        is an exception rather than the rule.  Since the power is
        given to the court, apprehension of its misuse cannot  be
        lightly presumed.    Indeed,  so  far  as  the  right  of
        cross-examination of the  accused  is  concerned,  it  is
        undoubtedly  a  very  valuable  and  effective instrument
        enabling the accused to defend himself appropriately  and
        effectively,  but  this  right  of  the accused has to be
        balanced against the interest of the society and may have
        to be modified where the interest of  society  does  call
        for such  modification.    All this discussion only means
        that if the court  is  satisfied  that  for  the  reasons
        mentioned  in the sub-clause, it is necessary to keep the
        identity and address of the witness secret, it  may  have
        to   take   appropriate   measures   and  make  necessary
        arrangements   for   ensuring   both   the    right    of
        cross-examination and  the protection of the witness.  In
        this behalf, it may be relevant to notice the judgment of
        the Supreme Court in Kartar Singh, (1994) 3 SCC  569,  at
        pages 688-689 sub-para 11 of the summary in para 368.  We
        are  also  of  the opinion that the power of the court to
        take appropriate  measures  to  permit  cross-examination
        even while protecting the identity of the witness must be
        deemed  to be implicit in sub-clauses (2) and (3) as they
        are found in the Bill.  It is  not  really  necessary  to
        amend any of the paragraphs in sub-clause (3) as proposed
        in  para  5.15  of our Working Paper inasmuch as the Bill
        does  not   propose   to   take   away   the   right   of
        cross-examination.   The  suggestion  for substitution of
        paragraph  (c)  in  sub-section  (3)  made  by  the   Law
        Commission  in  the  said  para  is accordingly withdrawn
        keeping in view the opinions expressed in the seminars.
         Sub-clause  (4)  is   merely   consequential   to
        sub-clause   (3)  in  the  sense  that  it  provides  for
        punishing the person violating a direction  issued  under
        sub-clause (3).
         Clause  15  provides  that  the  trial by special
        courts shall have precedence over the trial of any  other
        case  against the accused in any other court (not being a
        special court).  It also provides that the trial of  such
        other  case  shall remain in abeyance pending disposal of
        the trial before  the  special  court.    This  provision
        cannot  again  be reasonably objected to, particularly in
        view of the fact that we are suggesting elsewhere a  time
        limit  within which the special court should conclude the
        trial.  It is hoped that in course of time,  the  special
        courts   will   develop   expertise   in   dealing   with
        terrorism-related offences, thus enabling speedy disposal
        of the cases.
         By way of official amendments a new clause 15A is
        sought to be introduced.  Sub-clause (1) of  this  clause
        makes  the  confession  made  by a person before a police
        officer not lower in rank than a Superintendent of Police
        admissible  in  evidence  provided  it  is  recorded   in
        accordance with  the  provisions of the said clause.  The
        proviso  to  sub-clause  (1)  further  provides  that   a
        confession  made  by  a co-accused shall be admissible in
        evidence against  other  co-accused.     This   provision
        overrides  the  provisions to the contrary in the Code of
        Criminal  Procedure  and   the   Indian   Evidence   Act.
        Sub-clause  (2)  provides  that  a  police officer shall,
        before recording any confession, explain to  such  person
        in  writing  that  he is not bound to make confession and
        that if he makes any confession, it could be used against
        him.  The provisio to sub-clause (2) says  that  if  such
        person prefers to remain silent, the police officer shall
        not  compel  him  or  induce  him to make any confession.
        Sub-clause (3) says that the confession shall be recorded
        in an atmosphere free from threat or inducement and shall
        be recorded in the same language in  which  it  is  made.
        Sub-clause  (4)  creates  an  obligation  upon the police
        officer, who has recorded a confession  under  sub-clause
        (1),  to  produce  the person along with the confessional
        statement, without unreasonable delay, before  the  court
        of  a  Chief  Metropolitan  Magistrate  or the court of a
        Chief Judicial  Magistrate.     Sub-clause   (5)   is   a
        continuation of  sub-clause (4).  Sub-clause (5) provides
        that  the  Magistrate  before  whom  the  person  is   so
        produced, shall record the statement, if any, made by the
        person so  produced  and  get  his signature thereon.  It
        provides further  that  if  there  is  any  complaint  of
        torture  by  such  person,  he  shall  be  directed to be
        produced for medical examination before a medical officer
        not lower in rank than an Assistant Civil  Surgeon.    In
        our  opinion,  clause  15A, hedged in as it is by several
        safeguards, is a necessary provision in such a law.    It
        is  not as if the confession made before a police officer
        is made admissible without anything more.   Not  only  is
        the police officer under a duty to record a confession in
        the  same language in which it is made and if possible by
        employing mechanical devices  like  cassettes,  tapes  or
        sound  tracks,  he is also under an obligation to explain
        in writing to the person that any confession made by  him
        will be  used  against  him.   But the more important and
        truly  effective  safeguard  is  the  one  contained   in
        sub-clauses  (4) and (5) which sub-clauses, it is evident
        have been inserted in the light of and  in  pursuance  of
        the  observations  made  by  the  Supreme Court in Kartar
        Singh's case while  dealing  with  section  15  of  TADA.
        Sub-clauses  (4) and (5) read with sub-clause (1) do mean
        that unless a confession is recorded in  accordance  with
        the several provisions contained in clause 15A, including
        sub-clauses  (4)  and  (5),  such  confession will not be
        valid and admissible.  As already stated, sub-clauses (4)
        and (5) require that soon after recording  of  confession
        by  the  police  officer,  the  person  shall be produced
        before  a  Chief  Metropolitan  Magistrate  or  a   Chief
        Judicial  Magistrate  along  with the recorded confession
        and such magistrate  is  required  again  to  record  the
        statement  of  the  person and take his signature thereon
        and further, if the person complains of any  torture,  it
        is  obligatory upon the Magistrate to send him to medical
        officer not lower in rank than a Assistant Civil  Surgeon
        for medical  examination.    It  is difficult to find any
        legitimate  objection  to  such   a   provision   in   an
        anti-terrorism law.    As has been repeatedly pointed out
        during the course of seminars and the responses received,
        in an extraordinary  situation  (such  as  the  India  is
        facing  on  account  of  external and internal threats of
        terrorism), an extraordinary law is called for.  In fact,
        during the seminars, no serious objection  was  taken  to
        this   provision   except   the  general  objection  that
        confessions made before the police officers should not be
        made admissible because in that event they will resort to
        third degree methods to  obtain  confessions  and  as  an
        excuse  for  their  inability  to  investigate  the crime
        effectively.  In the light of the safeguards contained in
        clause 15A and, in particular, the  safeguards  contained
        in  sub-clauses  (4)  and  (5)  read  with sub-clause (1)
        thereof, the said criticism must be held to be untenable.
         So far as the proviso to sub-clause (1) of clause
        15A is concerned, a little explanation would be in order.
        In the TADA (Act 28 of 1987), clause (c)  of  sub-section
        (1)  of  section  21  provided  that  the confession of a
        co-accused was admissible.  However,  by  virtue  of  the
        1993  amendment to TADA, clause (c) in sub-section (1) of
        section 21 was omitted and at the same time clause  15(1)
        was  amended  by  introducing  the words "are co-accused,
        abettor or conspirator" after the words  "trial  of  such
        person".    In   sub-clause   (1),  a  proviso  was  also
        introduced which read:    "provided  that  co-accused  or
        conspirator  is  charged  and  tried  in  the  same  case
        together with the accused".    The  effect  of  the  1993
        amendment  was that unless the co-accused was charged and
        tried in the same case together  with  the  accused,  his
        confession  was  not  admissible  or relevant against the
        accused.  Though this aspect was not considered in Kartar
        Singh's case,  it  was  considered  in  Kalpnath  Rai  v.
        State,  1997(8) SCC 732 by a two-Judge Bench and later by
        a three-Judge Bench in State v.  Nalini, 1993 SCC  (Cri.)
        691.   In  Nalini's case, the majority (Wadhwa and Quadri
        JJ.) held that  because  of  the  clear  and  unambiguous
        language  employed  in  section  15  and,  in particular,
        having regard to the non-obstante clause with  which  the
        sub-section  opens,  there  is  no  reason  to  read  any
        limitation  upon  the  admissibility  of  confession   of
        co-accused as  indicated  in  Kalpnath  Rai's case.  They
        opined that overall decision in Kalpnath Rai's  case  and
        rationale  thereof  practically brings back section 30 of
        the Evidence Act into TADA by a back door.  The  majority
        held that the confession of the co-accused is substantive
        evidence and though it may not be substantial evidence in
        the  sense that the value to be attached to such evidence
        is a matter of appreciation of evidence in a given  case,
        it is wrong to say that it requires to be re-corroborated
        before it  is  made  admissible.    At the same time, the
        majority cautioned that as  a  matter  of  prudence,  the
        Court  may  look for some corroboration if the confession
        is to be used against the co-accused.
         It is evident that the proviso to sub-clause  (1)
        of  clause  15A  (sought  to  be  introduced  by Official
        Amendment in the  Criminal  Law  Amendment  Bill)  is  in
        effect  a reproduction of the provision obtaining in TADA
        as amended by the 1993  Amendment  Act.    The  question,
        however,  still  remains  whether  such  a  provision  is
        desirable.  It is one thing for the Court to  uphold  its
        validity  because  the  Court looks at the provision from
        the point of view of its constitutional validity  and  it
        is  altogether a different thing when the question arises
        about its desirability.  We are here concerned  with  the
        desirability of  such  a  provision.   In our opinion, if
        this  provision  is  retained,  the  very   concept   and
        necessity  of the provision regarding approver's evidence
        may become  unnecessary.    Since  the  evidence   of   a
        co-accused is ordinarily not admissible, necessity arises
        for  giving  pardon to one of the accused and make him an
        approver  so  that  his  evidence  may  be  relevant  and
        admissible against  the  other co-accused.  Section 30 of
        the Evidence Act which merely says that the evidence of a
        co-accused can be taken into  consideration  against  the
        other accused  is  based  upon  good reason.  It does not
        appear necessary to enlarge upon the principle of section
        30 of the Evidence  Act.    We  are,  therefore,  of  the
        opinion that proviso to sub-clause 15A(1) as suggested in
        the Official Amendment should be dropped.
         Clause  16  provides  for transfer by the special
        court of an  offence  to  an  ordinary  court  where  the
        special  court  finds it is not an offence triable by it.
        This is a necessary procedural provision and no objection
        has also been taken thereto.  Clause 17 which is the last
        clause in Part III provides for  an  appeal  against  the
        orders of the special court.  As originally provided, the
        appeal was provided to a High Court both on facts and law
        and  it was further directed that such an appeal shall be
        heard by a Bench of two Judges.   An  appeal  against  an
        interlocutory order  was,  of course, barred.  The period
        of limitation for filing an appeal was prescribed  as  30
        days  but  the  High Court was given the power to condone
        the delay on proof  of  sufficient  cause.    By  way  of
        Official  Amendments, the forum of appeal is sought to be
        substituted.  Instead of a  High  Court,  the  appeal  is
        sought to  be provided to the Supreme Court.  The proviso
        to sub-clause (1) which  is  sought  to  be  inserted  by
        Official  Amendments,  however,  says  that if the person
        tried by special court for an offence under this  Act  is
        convicted for any other offence (and is acquitted for any
        offence under this Act), he can file an appeal before the
        High Court.   The second proviso to sub-clause (1) sought
        to be introduced by the Official Amendment provides  that
        if  in  such  a case, an appeal is preferred by the State
        against the order of acquittal in respect of  an  offence
        under  this Act, the State can apply to the Supreme Court
        to withdraw the appeal, if any, filed by the  accused  in
        the  High  Court  for  being heard along with the State's
        appeal in the Supreme Court.  As a  consequence  of  this
        amendment,  sub-clause  (2)  of  clause  17 as originally
        drafted is sought to be deleted.  Several participants in
        the seminars and others have expressed the  opinion  that
        provision  of an appeal to the Supreme Court as suggested
        by the Official Amendments makes the said  remedy  almost
        unavailable  inasmuch  as  many  accused  may not be in a
        position to approach the Supreme Court having  regard  to
        the  cost  involved  and, in many cases, the distance and
        other inhibiting factors.  We are of the opinion that the
        amendment proposed by Official  Amendments  ought  to  be
        dropped  and  that clause 17 as originally drafted in the
        Bill should remain unchanged.
                               CHAPTER V             
         Part IV of the Bill contains clauses  18  to  24.
        The Official Amendments not only propose to amend several
        provisions  in this part but also propose to add one more
        clause, namely,  clause  25.    Clause  18  provides  for
        certain  modifications  in the Code of Criminal Procedure
        in  its  application  to  the  offences  under  the  Act.
        Sub-clause  (1)  provides  that  every offence punishable
        under this section shall be deemed to  be  a  "cognizable
        offence" and  a  "cognizable case".  Sub-clause (2) while
        providing that  section  167  of  the  Code  of  Criminal
        Procedure  shall apply in relation to a case involving an
        offence punishable under this Act, provides for extension
        of  several  periods  mentioned  in  sub-section  (2)  of
        section 167.    A  proviso  is also sought to be added by
        which the special court is given the power to extend  the
        period  further  in  case  it is not possible to conclude
        investigation within such extended period.    The  second
        proviso  sought to be added enables the police officer to
        ask for police custody of a person who may be in judicial
        custody if such a course is found necessary.   Sub-clause
        (3)  of clause 18 of the Bill provides that while section
        268 of the  Code  shall  apply  in  relation  to  a  case
        involving  an  offence  punishable  under  the  Act, such
        application  shall  be  subject  to   the   modifications
        provided in  the said sub-section.  The modifications are
        more or less  formal  in  nature.    Sub-clause  (4),  as
        originally  drafted, provided that sections 366, 367, 368
        and 371 of the Code shall apply to a  case  involving  an
        offence   triable   by   special  court  subject  to  the
        modification that for the expression "Court of  Session",
        it shall  be read as "Special Court".  By way of official
        amendments, sub-clause (4) is sought to  be  substituted.
        The  said  substitution  was  probably  thought  of  as a
        consequence of changing the forum of appeal in clause 17.
        (We have already expressed our opposition to the proposal
        to change the forum of appeal).   Sub-clauses  (5),  (6),
        (6A) (proposed to be inserted by Official Amendments) and
        sub-clause  (7), constitute and represent a single scheme
        dealing with the grant of bail.  Sub-clause (5) says that
        section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure  shall  not
        apply  to a person accused of having committed an offence
        punishable under this Act.  Sub-clause (6) says  that  no
        person  accused  of  an  offence  under this Act shall be
        released on bail or on his own  bond  unless  the  public
        prosecutor  has been given an opportunity of opposing the
        application for bail.    Sub-clause  (6A)  sought  to  be
        inserted  by Official Amendments provides that "where the
        public prosecutor opposes the application of the  accused
        for  release  on  bail,  no  person accused of an offence
        punishable under this Act or any rule made therein  shall
        be  released  on  bail  until the court is satisfied that
        there are grounds for believing that he is not guilty  of
        committing such  offence".   Sub-clause (7) provides that
        the  limitations  of  granting  a   bail   specified   in
        sub-clause (6) and sub-clause (6A) are in addition to the
        limitations  under the Code or any other law for the time
        being in force on granting of bail.
         There was a good amount of debate and  discussion
        on these  provisions  in  both  the  seminars.    In  the
        responses received by  the  Law  Commission  also,  these
        provisions have either been defended or opposed.  One set
        of objections was that the provison in sub-clause (6A) to
        the effect that no bail shall be granted unless the court
        is  satisfied  that "there are grounds for believing that
        he is not guilty of committing  such  offence"  makes  it
        almost impossible  for  any  accused to get bail.  In our
        opinion, there is no substance in this objection inasmuch
        as  this  is  the  very  language  which  was   used   in
        sub-section  (8) of section 20 of TADA and which has been
        the subject-matter of elaborate discussion  and  decision
        by the Supreme Court in Kartar Singh's case.  The Supreme
        Court  has  pointed  out that the language of sub-section
        (8) of section 20 of TADA is in  substance  no  different
        from the language employed in section 437(1) of the Code,
        section  35  of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1976
        and section 104 of the Customs Act, 1962.    The  Supreme
        Court  accordingly upheld the validity of sub-section (8)
        of  section  20  of  TADA  holding  that  the  respective
        provisions contained therein are not violative of Article
        21 of the Constitution.  Be that as it may, having regard
        to  the  purpose  and  object  underlying the Act and the
        context in which the  Act  has  become  necessary,  these
        restrictive  provisions  may not be likely to be assailed
        on any reasonable basis.  The  objection,  therefore,  is
         However,  certain  other  useful suggestions were
        made to which a reference is necessary.
         Justice J.S.  Verma, Chairperson, National  Human
        Rights Commission suggested that for the purpose of bail,
        the offences in the Act should be classified on the lines
        indicated by the Supreme Court in its decision in Shaheen
        Welfare Society's case [1996 (2) JT 719 (SC)].  This view
        was supported  by  Shri  P.P.   Rao, Senior Advocate, who
        emphasised  that  a   routine   refusal   of   bail   was
        unacceptable.   He  added  that since the normal rule was
        bail, any restriction placed thereon in an anti-terrorism
        law should  not  be  disproportionate,  making  the  very
        provision for    bail   meaningless.      Several   other
        participants also supported this line of reasoning  which
        we find eminently reasonable and acceptable.
         In  Shaheen  Welfare  Society's case (supra), the
        Supreme Court has suggested  categorisation  of  offences
        under  TADA into four categories for the purpose of bail.
        The following observations are relevant:
         "For  the  purpose  of  grant  of  bail  to  TADA
                detenus,  we  divide  the  undertrials  into four
                classes, namely, (a) hardcore  undertrials  whose
                release  would prejudice the prosecution case and
                whose liberty may prove to be a menace to society
                in general and to the complainant and prosecution
                witnesses in particular;  (b)  other  undertrials
                whose  overt acts or involvement directly attract
                sections  3  and/or  4  of  the  TADA  Act;   (c)
                undertrials  who are roped in, not because of any
                activity directly attracting sections  3  and  4,
                but  by  virtue of sections 120B or 147, IPC and;
                (d) those undertrials who were  found  possessing
                incriminating  articles in notified areas and are
                booked under section 5 of TADA.
         Ordinarily, it is true  that  the  provisions  of
                sections  20(8)  and 20(9) of TADA would apply to
                all the aforesaid classes.  But while adopting  a
                pragmatic  and  just approach, no one can dispute
                the fact that all of them cannot be dealt with by
                the same yardstick.  Different  approaches  would
                be  justified  on the basis of the gravity of the
                charges.  Adopting this approach we  are  of  the
                opinion that undertrials falling within group (a)
                cannot receive   liberal  treatment.    Cases  of
                undertrials falling in group (b) would have to be
                differently dealt with, in  that,  if  they  have
                been  in  prison for five years or more and their
                trial is not likely to be  completed  within  the
                next  six  months,  they  can be released on bail
                unless the court comes  to  the  conclusion  that
                their  antecedents  are  such that releasing them
                may be harmful to the lives  of  the  complaints,
                the   family   members  of  the  complainant,  or
                witnesses.   Cases  of  undertrials  falling   in
                groups  (c)  and  (d) can be dealt with leniently
                and they can be released if  they  have  been  in
                jail  for three years and two years respectively.
                Those falling in  group  (b),  when  released  on
                bail,  may  be  released on bail of not less than
                Rs.50,000/- with one surety for like  amount  and
                those  falling  in  groups  (c)  and  (d)  may be
                released on bail on their executing  a  bond  for
                Rs.30,000/-  with  one  surety  for  like amount,
                subject to the following terms:
         (1) the accused shall  report  to  the  concerned
                police station once a week;
         (2)  the  accused shall remain within the area of
                jurisdiction  of  the  Designated  Court  pending
                trial  and  shall  not leave the area without the
                permission of the Designated Court;
         (3) the accused shall deposit  his  passport,  if
                any, with  the  Designated Court.  If he does not
                hold a passport, he shall file  an  affidavit  to
                that effect  before  the  Designated  Court.  The
                Designated  Court  may  ascertain   the   correct
                position  from  the  passport  authorities, if it
                deems it necessary;
         (4) The Designated Court will be  at  liberty  to
                cancel  the  bail  if  any of those conditions is
                violated or a case for cancellation  of  bail  is
                otherwise made out.
         (5) Before granting bail, a notice shall be given
                to the public prosecutor and an opportunity shall
                be  given  to  him  to oppose the application for
                such release.  The Designated  Court  may  refuse
                bail in very special circumstances for reasons to
                be recorded in writing.
         These conditions may be relaxed in cases of those
                under groups (c) and (d) and, for special reasons
                to   be   recorded  in  the  case  of  group  (b)
                prisoners.  Also  these  directions  may  not  be
                applied  by the Designated Court in exceptionally
                grave cases such as the Bombay  Bomb  Blast  Case
                where  a  lengthy  trial is inevitable looking to
                the number of accused, the  number  of  witnesses
                and  the nature of charges unless the court feels
                that the trial is being unduly delayed.  However,
                even in such  cases  it  is  essential  that  the
                Review  Committee  examines the case against each
                accused bearing the above directions in mind,  to
                ensure that TADA provisions are not unnecessarily
         Although  the Court observed in the said judgment
        that the aforesaid directions were  "a  one-time  measure
        meant  only  to  alleviate  the  current  situation", the
        spirit and principle behind the said observations  should
        serve  as  guidelines to the Special Courts while dealing
        applications of bail of persons accused of offences under
        the Act, for the purposes of bail.
         Though we would like very much to incorporate the
        said classification in sub-clauses (5) to (7)  of  clause
        18,  we  find  it  difficult  to  do  so  in  view of the
        difficulty in incorporating the various  ideas  contained
        in the  above  judgment.  For example, the Court has said
        that  their   classification   is   not   applicable   to
        "exceptionally grave cases such as Bombay Bomb Blast Case
        ..."  What  is an exceptionally grave case has to be left
        to be determined by the special court in  a  given  case.
        In  view  of this drafting difficulty, we have not chosen
        to suggest an amendment to the said provisions.   It  may
        be  noted  that  the  decision  of  the  Supreme Court is
        binding on all courts by virtue of  Article  141  of  the
        Constitution  and  hence  it can be presumed that even in
        the absence of specific provisions  in  the  Act  on  the
        lines indicated in the judgment, the ratio and the spirit
        of  the  said  judgment  shall be followed by the special
        courts.  However, a new sub-clause may be added in clause
        18 providing that in case  of  foreign  terrorists,  bail
        should    not    be   granted   except   in   exceptional
        circumstances.  The sub-clause may read as follows :
         "(8) Notwithstanding anything in sub-section (7),
                no bail shall be granted to a person  accused  of
                an  offence  punishable  under this Act, if he is
                not an Indian citizen, except in very exceptional
                circumstances and for reasons recorded therefor."
         Clause 19 deals with cognizance of offences under
        the Act.  As originally drafted, the Bill  provided  that
        notwithstanding   anything   contained  in  the  Code  of
        Criminal Procedure, no information about  the  commission
        of  an  offence  under  this Act shall be recorded by the
        Police  without  the  prior  approval  of  the   District
        Superintendent of Police.  By way of Official Amendments,
        for  the  expression "District Superintendent of Police",
        the words "Inspector General of Police or,  as  the  case
        may  be,  the  Commissioner  of  Police" are sought to be
        substituted.  Sub-clause (2) of section 19 as  originally
        drafted  in  the  Bill provided that "No court shall take
        cognizance of any offence  under  this  Act  without  the
        previous  sanction of the Inspector General of Police, or
        as the case may be the Commissioner of Police".   By  way
        of  Official  Amendments, the words "Inspector General of
        Police or as the case may be the Commissioner of  Police"
        are   sought  to  be  substituted  by  the  words  "State
        Government or as the case may be the Central Government".
        It  was  pointed  out  by  several  participants  at  the
        seminars  that  the  requirement  of  "prior aproval" for
        recording an  information  about  the  commission  of  an
        offence  under  the  Act was an impractical provision and
        that therefore the requirement of prior approval  may  be
        removed  and  in  its  place  a  subsequent  approval  or
        ratification may  be  provided  for.    Indeed,  the  Law
        Commission  has  recommended  in  its  Working  Paper the
        insertion of clause 7A in Part II of the  Bill  providing
        that  the police officer recording information in respect
        of an offence  under  this  Act  shall  promptly  forward
        copies  of  all  the  material  including the FIR and its
        accompaniments to the DGP and the Review Committee.    It
        was  further provided that it shall be open to the DGP or
        the Review Committee to call for such further information
        as they may deem necessary from the Police or  any  other
        person  before approving or disapproving the action taken
        by the subordinate authority.  It was further recommended
        to be provided that  if  the  DGP  did  not  approve  the
        recording  of aforesaid information within ten days or if
        the Review Committee did not approve of the  same  within
        30  days,  the recording of information shall become null
        and void and no further action shall  be  taken  on  that
        behalf  and the accused, if in custody, shall be released
         Certain participants  in  the  Seminar  submitted
        that  the  requirement of the approval of the DGP and the
        Review Committee is not an effective  one.    So  far  as
        taking  of approval of court is concerned, the suggestion
        is misconceived and unacceptable.  It is not part of  the
        functions  of the court to approve FIRs, either before or
        after they are registered.  So far  as  approval  of  any
        other  independent  authority  is  concerned, we have not
        been able to find any such authority, now  in  existence,
        whose approval  can  be provided for at this stage.  This
        is a stage where the investigation too has not yet begun;
        it beings with and  after  registration  of  FIRs.    The
        suggestion     is,     therefore,    impracticable    and
        inappropriate.  We are of the opinion that the  provision
        suggested  by us is more appropriate and at the same time
        more effective than the one contained in  sub-clause  (1)
        of section 19.  Accordingly, we recommend that sub-clause
        (1)  of  section  19  be  substituted  by  the  following
         "(1) The police officer recording information  in
                respect  of  an  offence  under  this  Act  shall
                promptly  forward  copies  of  all  the  material
                including  the  FIR and its accompaniments to the
                Director  General  of  Police  and   the   Review
         (2)  It  shall be open to the Director General of
                Police or the Review Committee to call  for  such
                further  information, as they may deem necessary,
                from  the  police  or  any  other  person  before
                approving  or  disapproving,  as the case may be,
                the action taken by the subordinate authorities.
         (3) If the Director General of  Police  does  not
                approve    the   recording   of   the   aforesaid
                information within  10  days  or  if  the  Review
                Committee  does  not  approve  the same within 30
                days, the recording of the said information shall
                become null and void with effect from  the  tenth
                day or the thirtieth day, as the case may be, and
                all   proceedings  in  that  behalf  shall  stand
                withdrawn and if the accused is  in  custody,  he
                shall  be  released  forthwith unless required in
                connection with some other offence.
         (4) Any action taken or any  order  passed  under
                forgoing sub-sections shall be in addition to and
                independent of the review of pending cases by the
                Review Committee under section 27 of this Act.
         Sub-clause  (2)  of  section  19 provides that no
        court shall take cognizance of an offence under  the  Act
        without the previous sanction of the State Government or,
        as the case may be, of the Central Government (as amended
        by Official  Amendments).  In our opinion, this is a very
        salutory provision and  an  effective  safeguard  against
        frivolous or unfounded prosecutions.
         By  way  of  Official  Amendments,  a new clause,
        namely, clause 19A is sought to be inserted dealing  with
        arrest.   Sub-clause  (1)  of  the  proposed  new section
        provides that "whenever a person is arrested, information
        of his arrest shall be immediately  communicated  by  the
        police  officer  to  a  family member or to a relative of
        such person by telegram, telephone or by any other  means
        which  shall  be recorded by the police officer under the
        signature of  the  person  arrested".    Sub-clause   (2)
        directs  that where a police officer arrests a person, he
        shall provide a custody  memo  of  the  person  arrested,
        while   sub-clause   (3)   provides   that   "during  the
        interrogation  the  legal  practitioner  of  the   person
        arrested  shall  be  allowed  to  remain  present and the
        person arrested shall be informed of his right as soon as
        he is brought to the police station".    In  its  Working
        Paper, the Law Commission had supported the provisions in
        all the  three sub-clauses of clause 19A.  In particular,
        we  were  appreciative  of  the  provision  contained  in
        sub-clause  (3)  which was evidently put in, in the light
        of  the  decision  of  the  Supreme  Court   in   Nandini
        Satpathy's case.    However,  certain participants in the
        seminar including Mr.  K.T.S.  Tulsi,  former  Additional
        Solicitor  General,  opposed  the  provision contained in
        sub-section (3).    They  submitted   that   it   is   an
        impractical  provision and is likely to hinder the proper
        interrogation of the accused.  Mr.  Tulsi also  submitted
        that  subsequent  decisions  of  the  Supreme  Court  had
        explained the observations in  Nandini  Satpathy's  case.
        Be  that  as  it  may,  we do not think it appropriate to
        recommend the deletion of this provision which  has  been
        designedly introduced by the Government of India.
         A suggestion was put forward by Mr.  U.R.  Lalit,
        Senior  Advocate,  Supreme  Court  that  this  protection
        should be confined only to Indian citizens and should not
        be made available to non-citizens.  He pointed  out  that
        today, the foreign mercenaries and the foreign terrorists
        outnumber  local  terrorists,  particularly, in Jammu and
        Kashmir and  that  on  account  of  their  activities,  a
        situation  of  proxy  war  is  prevailing  in  Jammu  and
        Kashmir.  Learned counsel suggested that classifying  the
        foreign  terrorists  for the purpose of sub-clause (3) of
        clause 19A as a separate group and denying them the  said
        protection  would  be  a  case  of  reasonable  and valid
        classification.   The  suggestion  is   not   only   very
        attractive   and  appealing,  there  is  good  amount  of
        justification in Mr.  Lalit's contention that  the  entry
        in  large  numbers  (according to certain estimates there
        are already 5000 foreign terrorists in Jammu and  Kashmir
        and  another  15000  to  30000  terrorists are waiting to
        enter the State with a view  to  creating  conditions  of
        total   anarchy   and  chaos)  is  certainly  creating  a
        situation which is unparalleled anywhere  in  the  world.
        The  more  disturbing  factor  is  that  the neighbouring
        country whose hostile intentions towards India are not  a
        secret,  is  actively  training,  arming,  directing  and
        helping the foreign terrorists in all possible ways.   In
        such a situation, classifying the foreign terrorists as a
        distinct   category   from   the   local  terrorists  and
        restricting the protection in sub-clause  (3)  of  clause
        19A only to local terrorists i.e., who are citizens of
        India,    may    not    be    either    unreasonable   or
        unconstitutional.   In  this  connection,  it  is  highly
        relevant  to  notice  that  the Constitution itself makes
        such a  distinction  which  would  be  evident  from  the
        following position:    Clause (1) of article 22 says that
        "No person who is arrested shall be detained  in  custody
        without being informed, as soon as may be, of the grounds
        for  such  arrest  nor  shall  he  be denied the right to
        consult, and to be defended by, a legal  practitioner  of
        his choice".    Clause  (2) of the said article says that
        "Every person who is arrested  and  detained  in  custody
        shall  be produced before the nearest magistrate within a
        period of twenty-four hours of such arrest excluding  the
        time  necessary  for the journey from the place of arrest
        to court of the magistrate and no such  person  shall  be
        detained  in  custody  beyond the said period without the
        authority of a magistrate".  But clause (3) of  the  very
        same  article  says  that "Nothing in clauses (1) and (2)
        shall apply- (a) to any person who for the time being  is
        an enemy  alien".    In other words, the very significant
        constitutional safeguards contained in clauses (1) and
        (2) of article 22 are  not  available  to  enemy  aliens.
        Indeed,  the  requirement in clause (1) of article 22 and
        more particularly the one in sub-clause (1) of clause 19A
        is not possible of compliance in the case  of  a  foreign
        terrorist, inasmsuch as "a family member" or "a relative"
        of  such  foreign  terrorist  may not be in India and may
        also be difficult to locate.  We, therefore, suggest that
        the  requirement  of  informing  the  family  member   or
        relative shall be confined only to the person arrested if
        he is an Indian citizen.
         Clause  20 specifies the officers who alone shall
        be competent to investigate an offence  under  this  Act.
        Fairly  high  ranking  officers  are specified under this
        section which is again  an  assurance  against  abuse  or
        misuse of the powers under the Act.
         Clause   21   of   the   Bill   creates   certain
        presumptions in respect of the offences  under  the  Act.
        Sub-clause (1) reads as follows:
         "(1)  In  a  prosecution  for  an  offence  under
                sub-section (1) of section 3, if it is proved-
         (a) that the arms  or  explosives  or  any  other
                substances  specified in section 3 were recovered
                from the possession of the accused and  there  is
                reason to believe that such arms or explosives or
                other  substances  of a similar nature, were used
                in the commission of such offence; or
         (b)  that  by  the  evidence  of  an  expert  the
                finger-prints  of  the  accused were found at the
                site of the offence or on anything including arms
                and  vehicles  used  in   connection   with   the
                commission of such offence,
         the  Special  Court  shall  presume,  unless  the
                contrary  is  proved,  that   the   accused   had
                committed such offence."
         In our opinion, such a presumption cannot be said
        to be uncalled for in an anti-terrorism law.  However, on
        the  analogy  of disproportionate and excessive amplitude
        of presumption as drawn in respect of sub-clause  (2)  of
        clause  11A  (introduced  by  Amendment 6 of the Official
        Amendment) discussed  above,  we  recommend  the  similar
        modification here  also.    Sub-clause  (2)  creates  yet
        another presumption.  It says that "in a prosecution  for
        an  offence  under sub-section (3) of section 3, if it is
        proved that the accused rendered any financial assistance
        to a person, having knowledge that such person is accused
        of or reasonably  suspected  of  an  offence  under  that
        section,  the  special  court  shall  presume, unless the
        contrary is proved, that such  person  has  committed  an
        offence  under  that  sub-section"  (as  modified  by the
        Official Amendments).  No objection  has  been  taken  to
        these  proposals  by  any  of  the  participants  in  the
        seminars.  However, as stated above, the disproportionate
        and excessive amplitude  of  presumption  should  not  be
        allowed to   be  drawn.    We,  therefore,  recommend  to
        substitute the  words  "shall  presume...    under   that
        sub-section"  in  the  sub-clause (2) by the words "shall
        draw the adverse inference against the accused."
         Clause 22 clarifies that the jurisdiction of  the
        courts  or  authorities under the laws relating to naval,
        military, air force or other armed forces  of  the  Union
        are not  affected  by this Act.  It also clarifies that a
        special court under the Act shall be deemed to be a court
        of ordinary criminal jurisdiction.
         Clause 23 gives  overriding  effect  to  the  Act
        which again is unobjectionable.  Sub-clause (1) of clause
        24   provides   for   indemnity   in  favour  of  Central
        Government, State Government or any of their officers  or
        authorities on whom powers have been conferred by the Act
        in  respect  of acts done or purported to be done by them
        in good faith.    This  is  a  usual  provision  in  such
        enactments and no objection can be taken thereto.
         However,  with  a  view  to  make  the  indemnity
        effective and complete, the following proviso be added to
        sub-clause (1) of clause 24 of the Bill:-
         "Provided further that no  suit,  prosecution  or
        other  legal  proceedings  shall  lie against any serving
        member or retired member of the  Armed  Forces  or  other
        para  military  forces  in respect of any action taken or
        purported to be taken by him in good faith, in the course
        of any operation directed towards combating terrorism".
         Sub-clause (2) of section 24 makes it an  offence
        for  a  police  officer  to  take proceedings against any
        person for any offence  under  the  Act  for  corrupt  or
        malicious reasons.    It  is  sought  to  be  modified in
        certain minor respects  by  Official  Amendments.    This
        provision  again is a very salutory addition and is to be
         In this context, it may be appropriate to provide
        a remedy to the person  who  has  been  arrested  and  or
        proceeded against for offences under the proposed law for
        corrupt,  extraneous  or  malicious reasons by the police
        officers.  Provision of such a remedy is bound to act  as
        a  check  upon the propensity of the police/investigating
        officer to misuse their powers  and  rope  in  innocents.
        The  person  so  dealt  with unlawfully should be awarded
        monetary compensation appropriate in the circumstances by
        the State itself.  Indeed, if the exercise  of  power  by
        the  police  or  investigating  officer  is  found  to be
        actuated   by   corrupt,    extraneous    or    malicious
        considerations,  the  monetary compensation to be awarded
        to  the  person  concerned  should  be  levied  upon  the
        concerned police/investigating officers.  It is true that
        while  ratifying  the International Covenant on Civil and
        Political Rights (1996) (ICCPR), the Government of  India
        filed  a specific reservation against article 9(5) of the
        said Covenant on the ground that the Indian legal  system
        did  not recognise a right to compensation for victims of
        unlawful arrest or detention, but the Supreme Court  held
        in D.K.  Basu v.  State of West Bengal (1997 SCC (Cri) 92
        at  page  112)  that  the  said reservation "has lost its
        relevance in view of the law laid down by this Court in a
        number   of   cases   awarding   compensation   for   the
        infringement  of  the  fundamental  right  to  life  of a
        citizen".  Be that as it  may,  a  provision  of  such  a
        remedy   would  be  not  only  fair  and  just  but  also
        consistent with the democratic and developing concepts of
        criminal jurisprudence.
         Clause 25 sought to  be  introduced  by  Official
        Amendments  empowers  the Supreme Court to make rules, if
        any, as it  may  deem  necessary  for  carrying  out  the
        provisions of  this  Act  relating to special courts.  We
        are of the opinion that such a power should be  conferred
        upon  the  High  Courts  in the country (and not upon the
        Supreme Court) in view of the fact that we are suggesting
        that an appeal against the  judgment  and  order  of  the
        special  court should lie to the High Court concerned and
        not to the Supreme Court.
         Clause 26  sought  to  be  inserted  by  Official
        Amendments  confers  rulemaking  power  upon  the Central
        Government to carry out the purposes  and  provisions  of
        the Act.    Sub-section  (2)  elucidates the purposes and
        provisions mentioned in sub-section (1).
         Clause 27 which is also proposed to  be  inserted
        by  Official  Amendments  provides  for  constitution  of
        Review Committees.  Sub-clause (1) says that the  Central
        Government shall constitute a Review Committee consisting
        of  the  Home Secretary, Law Secretary and Secretaries of
        the other concerned Ministries, if any, to review, at the
        end of each quarter in a year the cases instituted by the
        Central Government under this Act.  The Review  Committee
        shall  be  competent  to  give  such directions as it may
        think  appropriate  with  respect  to  the  conduct   and
        continuance  of any case or a class of cases, as the case
        may be.   Sub-clause  (2)  contemplates  constitution  of
        similar committees  by the State Governments.  The Review
        Committee to be constituted by a State  Government  shall
        consist  of  the  Chief Secretary to the Government, Home
        Secretary, Law Secretary and  Secretaries  of  the  other
        concerned departments.
                              CHAPTER VI            
         (a)     It was   suggested   by   Mr.    Prashant
                Bhushan,  Advocate,  Supreme  Court  that   there
                should be a provision for appeal against an order
                refusing bail.    We  are  inclined to agree with
                this plea.  But the appeal  should  be  not  only
                against  an  order refusing bail but also against
                an order  granting  bail.    Accordingly,  it  is
                recommended   that  the  following  provision  be
                inserted as sub-section (5) in section 17 of  the
         "(5) Notwithstanding anything contained in the
                        Code,  an  appeal  shall  be  to the High
                        Court, against an order  of  the  Special
                        Court granting or refusing bail."
         (b)     Mr.  P.S.    Rao,  Joint Secretary in the
                Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India
                mentioned  during  his  presentation   that   the
                foreign     governments,    especially    Western
                governments, were objecting to special courts and
                special laws to deal with terrorism in India  and
                that this factor was giving rise to complications
                in the matter of extradition requests from India.
                So far as the special law is concerned, we do not
                see  how it can constitute a ground for objection
                when western democracies like U.S.  and U.K.  too
                have enacted (and  are  enacting)  anti-terrorism
                laws.   So  far  as special courts are concerned,
                their creation has become  necessary  because  of
                the  extraordinary  heavy  load upon our criminal
                courts and the delays  endemic  to  our  criminal
                judicial system.    It may, however, be seen that
                there is no qualitative  difference  between  the
                general criminal procedure applicable to ordinary
                criminal   courts   and  the  criminal  procedure
                applicable to special courts.  The principle  and
                perhaps   the  sole  object  behind  creation  of
                special courts is the anxiety to have these cases
                disposed of expeditiously.  We cannot, therefore,
                see any valid ground for objection on this score.
                It is of  course  a  matter  of  policy  for  the
                government   to   decide  whether  they  wish  to
                dispense with the special courts, while retaining
                the procedural changes provided by this  Act  and
                invest  the jurisdiction to try these offences on
                ordinary criminal courts with a direction to give
                precedence to the trial of  offences  under  this
         Some participants suggested that a new chapter be
        included  in  this  Act  itself  providing for banning of
        terrorist organisations.  If the Government accepts  this
        proposal,  a  new chapter may be introduced providing for
        banning  of  terrorist  organisations  and  making  their
        membership an  offence.   It should also be provided that
        any  person  rendering  any  assistance  to  such  banned
        organisations  including  raising  of  funds  shall be an
        offence.  In this  context,  the  provision  of  Unlawful
        Activities  (Prevention)  Act,  1967 may be kept in view,
        which Act  does  provide  for  declaring  an  association
        unlawful and  the  consequences flowing therefrom.  It is
        because of the existence of the said Act that we have not
        ourselves suggested a new chapter providing  for  banning
        of terrorist  organisations.    But  inasmuch  as certain
        participants felt that the said 1967 Act is not adequate,
        we are mentioning the said fact here.  Sub-section (5) of
        Section 3 has also to be kept in view in this  behalf  as
        also   Clause  (b)  of  sub-section  (1)  of  Section  3,
        suggested by us.
         Shri Prashant Bhushan, Advocate was of  the  view
        that    special    training   should   be   imparted   to
        investigators, prosecutors  and  special  judges  without
        which terrorist activities cannot be countered.  Further,
        for   effective   implementation   of  these  suggestions
        sufficient finance must also be provided.  It is for  the
        government to take a decision in this matter.
         Brig.  Satbir Singh, Institute of Defence Studies
        also  projected  his  experience in North East, J & K and
        Punjab.  He was of the view that special courts should be
        constituted  in  North-Eastern  States   to   deal   with
        terrorist activities.    Besides,  there should be speedy
        trial of such cases.  He suggested that defence personnel
        and  para-military  forces  personnel  should   also   be
        empowered to investigate the cases dealing with terrorist
        activities.   It is for the Government to take a decision
        in these matters.
         We recommend  accordingly.    Besides  the  other
        measures recommended, for the sake of convenience, we are
        appending   the  `Prevention  of  Terrorism  Bill,  2000'
        (Annexure II) which also incorporates the recommendations
        set out above.
         MEMBER                     MEMBER     MEMBER-SECRETARY
        Dated:  13.04.2000
                        ANNEXURE II        
                     DRAFT BILL AS RECOMMENDED BY
        A BILL to  make  provisions  for  the prevention of, and for coping
        with,  terrorist  activities  and  for   matters   connected
         BE  it enacted by Parliament in the Fifty-First Year
        of the Republic of India as follows:-
         PART I
        1.       Short title and extent.- (1) This Act may be  called
        the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2000.
         (2) It extends to the whole of lndia, and it applies
        also to --
         (a) citizens of India outside India;
         (b)  persons  in  the  service  of  the  Government,
                wherever they may be; and
         (c) persons on ships and  aircrafts,  registered  in
                India, wherever they may be.
         (3)  It  shall  remain in force for a period of five
        years from the date of  its  commencement,  but  its  expiry
        under the operation of this sub-section shall not affect -
         (a) the previous operation of, or anything duly done
                or suffered under this Act, or
         (b)  any  right,  privilege, obligation or liability
                acquired, accrued or incurred under this Act, or
         (c) any penalty, forfeiture or  punishment  incurred
                in respect of any offence under this Act, or
         (d) any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in
                respect  of  any  such right, privilege, obligation,
                liability,  penalty,  forfeiture  or  punishment  as
         and,  any  such  investigation,  legal proceeding or
                remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced  and
                any  such  penalty,  forfeiture or punishment may be
                imposed as if this Act had not expired.
        2.       Definitions.- (1) In this Act,  unless  the  context
        otherwise requires,-
         (a)  "Code"  means  the  Code of Criminal Procedure,
         (b) `proceeds of terrorism' shall mean all kinds  of
                properties  which have been derived or obtained from
                commission  of  any  terrorist  act  or  have   been
                acquired  through  funds  traceable to terrorist act
                and shall include cash,  irrespective  of  in  whose
                name   such   proceeds  are  standing  or  in  whose
                possession they are found;
         (c) "property" means property and  assets  of  every
                description,   whether   corporeal  or  incorporeal,
                movable or immovable,  tangible  or  intangible  and
                deeds   and  instruments  evidencing  title  to,  or
                interest in, such property or assets;
         (d) "Public Prosecutor" means a Public Prosecutor or
                an Additional Public Prosecutor or a Special  Public
                Prosecutor  appointed  under section 23 and includes
                any person acting under the directions of the Public
         (e)  "Special   Court"   means   a   Special   Court
                constituted under section 18;
         (f)  "terrorist  act" has the meaning assigned to it
                in sub-section (1) of section 3, and the  expression
                "terrorist" shall be construed accordingly;
         (g)  words  and  expressions used but not defined in
                this Act and defined in  the  Code  shall  have  the
                meanings respectively assigned to them in the Code.
         (2)  Any  reference  in this Act to any enactment or
        any provision thereof shall, in relation to an area in which
        such enactment  or  such  provision  is  not  in  force,  be
        construed  as  a  reference  to the corresponding law or the
        relevant provision of the  corresponding  law,  if  any,  in
        force in that area.
        PART II
        3.       Punishment for terrorist acts.- (1) Whoever,-
         (a)  with  intent  to threaten the unity, integrity,
                security or sovereignty of India or to strike terror
                in the people or any section of the people does  any
                act  or  thing  by  using  bombs,  dynamite or other
                explosive substances or  inflammable  substances  or
                fire-arms  or  other  lethal  weapons  or poisons or
                noxious gases or other chemicals  or  by  any  other
                substances  (whether  biological  or otherwise) of a
                hazardous nature, in such a manner as to  cause,  or
                likely to cause, death of, or injuries to any person
                or  persons or loss of, or damage to, or destruction
                of, property or  distribution  of  any  supplies  or
                services  essential  to the life of the community or
                causes damage or  destruction  of  any  property  or
                equipment  used  or  intended  to  be  used  for the
                defence of India or in  connection  with  any  other
                purposes  of  the  Government  of  India,  any State
                Government or any of their agencies, or detains  any
                person  and  threatens to kill or injure such person
                in order to  compel  the  Government  or  any  other
                person to do or abstain from doing any act;
         (b) is or continues to be a member of an association
                declared  unlawful  under  the  Unlawful  Activities
                (Prevention) Act, 1967, or voluntarily does  an  act
                aiding  or  promoting  in  any manner the objects of
                such association and in either case is in possession
                of any unlicenced firearms, ammunition, explosive or
                other instrument or  substance  capable  of  causing
                mass  destruction  and  commits any act resulting in
                loss of human life or grievous injury to any  person
                or causes significant damage to any property,
         commits a terrorist act.
         (2) Whoever commits a terrorist act, shall,-
         (i)  if  such  act  has resulted in the death of any
                person, be punishable with death or imprisonment for
                life and shall also be liable to fine;
         (ii)  in  any  other  case,   be   punishable   with
                imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than
                five  years but which may extend to imprisonment for
                life and shall also be liable to fine.
         (3) Whoever conspires  or  attempts  to  commit,  or
        advocates,   abets,   advises   or   incites   or  knowingly
        facilitates the commission of, a terrorist act  or  any  act
        preparatory  to  a  terrorist  act, shall be punishable with
        imprisonment for a term which shall not be  less  than  five
        years  but  which  may  extend  to imprisonment for life and
        shall also be liable to fine.
         (4) Whoever voluntarily  harbours  or  conceals,  or
        attempts  to harbour or conceal any person knowing that such
        person is a terrorist shall be punishable with  imprisonment
        for  a  term  which  shall  not be less than three years but
        which may extend to imprisonment for life and shall also  be
        liable to fine.
         Exception.-  This sub-section shall not apply to any
        case in which the harbour or concealment is by  the  husband
        or wife of the offender.
         (5)  Any  person who is a member of a terrorist gang
        or a terrorist organisation, which is involved in  terrorist
        acts, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which
        shall  not  be  less than five years but which may extend to
        imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to fine.
         (6) Whoever holds any property derived  or  obtained
        from  commission  of  any terrorist act or has been acquired
        through  the  terrorist  funds  shall  be  punishable   with
        imprisonment  for  a  term which shall not be less than five
        years but which may extend  to  imprisonment  for  life  and
        shall also be liable to fine.
         (7) Whoever threatens any person who is a witness or
        any  other  person  in  whom such witness may be interested,
        with violence,  or  wrongfully  restrains  or  confines  the
        witness,  or  any  other  person  in whom the witness may be
        interested, or does any other unlawful  act  with  the  said
        intent,  shall  be  punishable  with  imprisonment which may
        extend to three years and fine.
         (8)  A  person  receiving  or   in   possession   of
        information  which  he  knows  or believes to be of material
        assistance -
         (i) in preventing the commission by any other person
                of a terrorist act; or
         (ii) in securing the  apprehension,  prosecution  or
                conviction  of  any  other  person  for  an  offence
                involving the commission, preparation or instigation
                of such an act,
         and fails, without  reasonable  cause,  to  disclose
                that  information  as soon as reasonably practicable
                to the police, shall be punished  with  imprisonment
                for  a  term which may extend to one year or fine or
                with both.
        4.       Possession of certain unauthorised  arms,  etc.,  in
        notified  areas.-  Where  any person is in possession of any
        arms and ammunition specified in columns 2 and 3 of Category
        I or Category III(a) of Schedule I to the Arms Rules,  1962,
        or   bombs,   dynamite   or   other   explosive   substances
        unauthorisedly in a notified area, he shall, notwithstanding
        anything contained in any other law for the  time  being  in
        force,  be  punishable  with  imprisonment  for a term which
        shall not be less than five years but which  may  extend  to
        imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to fine.
         Explanation.-  In this section "notified area" means
        such area as the State Government may,  by  notification  in
        the Official Gazette, specify.
        5.       Enhanced  penalties.-  (1) If any person with intent
        to aid any terrorist contravenes any provision  of,  or  any
        rule  made  under,  the  Arms Act, 1959, the Explosives Act,
        1884, the Explosive Substances Act, 1908 or the  Inflammable
        Substances  Act,  1952,  he  shall, notwithstanding anything
        contained in any of the aforesaid Acts  or  the  rules  made
        thereunder, be punishable with imprisonment for a term which
        shall  not  be  less than five years but which may extend to
        imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to fine.
         (2) For the purposes of this section, any person who
        attempts to contravene or abets, or does any act preparatory
        to the contravention of any provision of any  law,  rule  or
        order,  shall  be deemed to have contravened that provision,
        and the provisions of sub-section (1) shall, in relation  to
        such  person,  have  effect subject to the modification that
        the reference to "imprisonment for life" shall be  construed
        as a reference to "imprisonment for ten years".
        6.       Holding  of  proceeds  of terrorism illegal.- (1) No
        person shall hold or be in possession  of  any  proceeds  of
         (2)   Proceeds  of  terrorism,  whether  held  by  a
        terrorist or by any other person and  whether  or  not  such
        person  is  prosecuted or convicted under this Act, shall be
        liable to be forfeited to  the  Central  Government  in  the
        manner hereinafter provided.
        7.       Powers of investigating officers.-    (1)     If    an
        officer (not below the rank  of  Superintendent  of  Police)
        investigating  an  offence  committed  under  this  Act, has
        reason to believe that any property in relation to which  an
        investigation  is  being  conducted, constitutes proceeds of
        terrorism, he shall, with the prior approval in  writing  of
        the  Director  General  of  the Police of the State in which
        such property  is  situated,  make  an  order  seizing  such
        property  and  where  it  is  not  practicable to seize such
        property, make an order of attachment  directing  that  such
        property  shall  not  be transferred or otherwise dealt with
        except with the prior permission of the officer making  such
        order, or of the Designated Authority, or the Special Court,
        as  the  case  may  be, before whom the properties seized or
        attached are produced and a copy  of  such  order  shall  be
        served on the person concerned.
         (2)  The investigating officer shall duly inform the
        Designated Authority or, as the case  may  be,  the  Special
        Court, within forty-eight hours of the seizure or attachment
        of such property.
         (3)  It shall be open to the Designated Authority or
        the  Special  Court  before  whom  the  seized  or  attached
        properties  are  produced  either  to  confirm or revoke the
        order of attachment so issued.
         (4) In the case of immovable  property  attached  by
        the  investigating  officer, it shall be deemed to have been
        produced before the  Designated  Authority  or  the  Special
        Court, as the case may be, when the Investigating Officer so
        notifies  in his report and places it at the disposal of the
        Designated Authority or the Special Court, as the  case  may
        8.       Forfeiture  of  proceeds  of  terrorism.-  Where any
        property is  seized  or  attached  in  the  belief  that  it
        constitutes proceeds of terrorism and is produced before the
        Designated  Authority, it shall, on being satisfied that the
        said  property  constitutes  proceeds  of  terrorism,  order
        forfeiture  of such property, whether or not the person from
        whose possession it is seized or attached, is prosecuted  in
        a Special Court for an offence under this Act.
        9.       Issue  of  show-cause  notice  before  forfeiture of
        proceeds of terrorism.- (1) No order forfeiting any proceeds
        of terrorism shall be made under section 8 unless the person
        holding or in possession of such proceeds is given a  notice
        in  writing  informing  him  of  the  grounds on which it is
        proposed to forfeit  the  proceeds  of  terrorism  and  such
        person is given an opportunity of making a representation in
        writing  within  such reasonable time as may be specified in
        the notice against the grounds of  forfeiture  and  is  also
        given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in the matter.
         (2)  No  order  of  forfeiture  shall  be made under
        sub-section (1), if such person establishes  that  he  is  a
        bona  fide  transferee  of  such  proceeds for value without
        knowing that they represent proceeds of terrorism.
         (3)  It  shall  be  competent  to   the   Designated
        Authority  to make an order in respect of property seized or
         (a)     in  the  case  of  a  perishable   property,
                directing  it  to  be  sold  and  the  provisions of
                section 459 of the Code shall, as nearly as  may  be
                practicable, apply to the net proceeds of such sale;
         (b)     in   the   case   of   any  other  property,
                nominating any  officer  of  the  Central  or  State
                Government   to   perform   the   function   of  the
                Administrator  of  such  property  subject  to  such
                conditions  as  may  be  specified by the Designated
        10.      Appeal.- (1) Any person aggrieved  by  an  order  of
        forfeiture  under  section  8 may, within one month from the
        date of the communication to him of such  order,  appeal  to
        the  High  Court  within  whose  jurisdiction the Designated
        Authority, who passed the order to be appealed  against,  is
         (2)  Where  an  order under section 8 is modified or
        annulled by  the  High  Court  or  where  in  a  prosecution
        instituted  for the violation of the provisions of this Act,
        the person against whom an order of forfeiture has been made
        under  section  8,  is  acquitted  such  property  shall  be
        returned to him and in either case if it is not possible for
        any  reason  to  return the proceeds of terrorism forfeited,
        such person shall be paid  the  price  therefor  as  if  the
        proceeds   of   terrorism  had  been  sold  to  the  Central
        Government with reasonable interest calculated from the  day
        of seizure of the proceeds of terrorism and such price shall
        be determined in the manner prescribed.
        11.      Order  of  forfeiture  not  to  interfere with other
        punishments.The order of forfeiture made under this  Act  by
        the  Designated  Authority, shall not prevent the infliction
        of any other punishment to which the person affected thereby
        is liable under this Act.
        12.      Claims by third  party.-  (1)  Where  any  claim  is
        preferred,  or  any  objection is made to the seizure of any
        property under section 7 on the ground that such property is
        not liable to such seizure, the Designated Authority, or  as
        the  case  may  be,  the  Special  Court,  before  whom such
        property is produced, shall proceed to investigate the claim
        or objection:
         Provided that no such investigation  shall  be  made
        where   the   Designated  Authority  or  the  Special  Court
        considers that the claim or objection was designed to  cause
        unnecessary delay.
         (2)  In  case  claimant or objector establishes that
        the property specified in the notice issued under section  9
        is  not  liable to be attached or confiscated under the Act,
        the said notice shall be withdrawn or modified accordingly.
        13.      Powers of the Designated Authority.- The  Designated
        Authority,  acting  under  the provisions of this Act, shall
        have all the powers of a Civil Court required for  making  a
        full and fair enquiry into the matter before it.
        14.      Obligation     to    furnish    information.-    (1)
        Notwithstanding anything contained in  any  other  law,  the
        officer investigating any offence under this Act, shall have
        power  to  require  any  officer or authority of the Central
        Government or a State Government or a local authority  or  a
        Bank,   company,   or  a  firm  or  any  other  institution,
        establishment, organisation or  any  individual  to  furnish
        information in their possession in relation to such offence,
        on  points  or  matters,  as in the opinion of such officer,
        will be useful for, or relevant to,  the  purposes  of  this
         (2)  Failure  to  furnish the information called for
        under sub-section(1), or furnishing false information  shall
        be  punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend
        to three years or fine, or with both.
         (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in the  Code,
        the  offence  under  sub-section  (1)  shall  be  tried as a
        summary case and the procedure prescribed in Chapter XXI  of
        the  said Code (except sub-section (2) of section 262) shall
        be applicable thereto.
         (4) Any officer in  possession  of  any  information
        shall furnish the same suo motu to the officer investigating
        an offence under this Act, if in the opinion of such officer
        such information will be useful to the investigating officer
        for the purposes of this Act.
        15.      Certain transfers to be null and void.- Where, after
        the  issue  of an order under section 7 or issue of a notice
        under section 9, any property referred to in the said  order
        or  notice  is  transferred  by  any  mode  whatsoever, such
        transfer shall, for the purpose  of  the  proceedings  under
        this  Act,  be  ignored and if such property is subsequently
        forfeited, the transfer of such property shall be deemed  to
        be null and void.
        16.      Forfeiture  of  property  of  certain  persons.- (1)
        Where a person has been convicted of any offence  punishable
        under  this  Act,  the  Special  Court  may,  in addition to
        awarding any punishment, by order in writing,  declare  that
        any  property, movable or immovable or both, produced before
        the Courts and belonging to the accused and specified in the
        order, shall stand forfeited to the Government free from all
         (2) Where any person is accused of any offence under
        this Act, it shall be open to the Special Court  trying  him
        to  pass an order that all or any of the properties, movable
        or immovable or both belonging to  him,  shall,  during  the
        period  of  such trial, be attached, if not already attached
        under this Act, and where such trial ends in conviction, the
        properties  so  attached  shall  stand  forfeited   to   the
        Government free from all encumbrances.
        17.      Company to transfer shares to Government.- Where any
        shares  in a company stand forfeited to the Government under
        this Act, then, the company shall, notwithstanding  anything
        contained  in  the  Companies  Act, 1956, or the articles of
        association  of  the   company,   forthwith   register   the
        Government as the transferee of such shares.
        PART III
        18.      Special  Courts.-  (1)  The  Central Government or a
        State  Government  may,  by  notification  in  the  Official
        Gazette, constitute one or more Special Courts for such area
        or  areas,  or  for such case or class or group of cases, as
        may be specified in the notification.
         (2) Where  a  notification  constituting  a  Special
        Court  for  any  area  or  areas or for any case or class or
        group of cases is issued by  the  Central  Government  under
        sub-section(1),  and  a  notification constituting a Special
        court for the same area or areas or for  the  same  case  or
        class  or  group  of cases has also been issued by the State
        Government  under  that  sub-section,  the   Special   Court
        constituted   by   the   Central   Government,  whether  the
        notification constituting such Court  is  issued  before  or
        after the issue of the notification constituting the Special
        Court  by  the State Government, shall have, and the Special
        Court constituted by the State Government  shall  not  have,
        jurisdiction  to  try  any offence committed in that area or
        areas or, as the case may be, the case or class or group  of
        cases,  and  all  cases  pending  before  any  Special Court
        constituted by the State Government shall stand  transferred
        to the Special Court constituted by the Central Government.
         (3) Where any question arises as to the jurisdiction
        of  any  Special  Court, it shall be referred to the Central
        Government whose decision thereon shall be final.
         (4) A Special Court shall  be  presided  over  by  a
        judge  to  be appointed by the Central Government or, as the
        case may be, the State Government, with the  concurrence  of
        the Chief Justice of the High Court.
         (5)  The  Central Government or, as the case may be,
        the State Government may also appoint, with the  concurrence
        of the Chief Justice of the High Court, additional judges to
        exercise jurisdiction of a Special Court.
         (6)  A person shall not be qualified for appointment
        as a judge or an additional judge of a Special Court  unless
        he is, immediately before such appointment, a sessions judge
        or an additional sessions judge in any State.
         (7) For the removal of doubts, it is hereby provided
        that  the  attainment by a person appointed as a judge or an
        additional  judge  of  a  Special  Court  of  the   age   of
        superannuation  under  the  rules  applicable  to him in the
        service  to  which  he  belongs,  shall   not   affect   his
        continuance as such judge or additional judge.
         (8)  Where any additional judge or additional judges
        is or are appointed in a Special Court,  the  judge  of  the
        Special  Court may, from time to time, by general or special
        order, in writing, provide for the distribution of  business
        of  the Special Court among himself and the additional judge
        or additional judges and also for  the  disposal  of  urgent
        business  in  the event of his absence or the absence of any
        additional judge.
         (9) A Designated Court constituted under sub-section
        (1)  of  section  9  of   the   Terrorist   and   Disruptive
        Activities(Prevention)  Act,  1987  for any area or areas or
        any case or class or group of cases shall be deemed to be  a
        Special Court for the purposes of this Act.
        19.      Place  of  sitting.- A Special Court may, on its own
        motion or on an application made by the  Public  Prosecutor,
        and  if it considers it expedient or desirable so to do, sit
        for any of its proceedings at  any  place,  other  than  its
        ordinary place of sitting:
         Provided  that  nothing  in  this  section  shall be
        construed to change the place of sitting of a Special  Court
        constituted  by a State Government to any place outside that
        20.      Jurisdiction of Special Courts.- (1) Notwithstanding
        anything contained in the  Code,  every  offence  punishable
        under any provision of this Act shall be triable only by the
        Special   Court  within  whose  local  jurisdiction  it  was
        committed or, as the case  may  be,  by  the  Special  Court
        constituted for trying such offence under section 7.
         (2)  If,  having  regard  to  the  exigencies of the
        situation prevailing in a State,-
         (i) it is not possible to have a fair, impartial  or
                speedy trial; or
         (ii)  it  is  not feasible to have the trial without
                occasioning the breach of peace or grave risk to the
                safety of the accused,  the  witnesses,  the  Public
                Prosecutor and the judge of the Special Court or any
                of them; or
         (iii)  it  is  not  otherwise  in  the  interests of
         the Supreme Court  may  transfer  any  case  pending
        before  a  Special  Court  to any other Special Court within
        that State or in any other State.
         (3) The Supreme Court may  act  under  this  section
        either  on  the  application  of the Central Government or a
        party interested and any such application shall be  made  by
        motion,  which  shall,  except  when  the  applicant  is the
        Attorney-General of India,  be  supported  by  affidavit  or
        21.      Power  of  Special  Courts  with  respect  to  other
        offences.- (1) When trying any offence, a Special Court  may
        also try any other offence with which the accused may, under
        the  Code,  be  charged  at the same trial if the offence is
        connected with such other offence.
         (2) If, in the course of any trial under this Act of
        any offence,  it  is  found  that  the  accused  person  has
        committed  any  other  offence  under  this Act or under any
        other law, the Special Court may convict such person of such
        other offence and pass any sentence authorised by  this  Act
        or such rule or, as the case may be, such other law, for the
        punishment thereof.
        22.      Power to direct for samples, etc.- (1) When a police
        officer  investigating  a case requests the Court of a Chief
        Judicial Magistrate or the Court  of  a  Chief  Metropolitan
        Magistrate in writing for obtaining samples of hand writing,
        finger  prints,  foot  prints,  photographs,  blood, saliva,
        semen,  hair,  voice  of  any  accused  person,   reasonably
        suspected  to  be  involved  in the commission of an offence
        under this Act, it shall be lawful for the Court of a  Chief
        Judicial  Magistrate  or  the  Court of a Chief Metropolitan
        Magistrate to direct that  such  samples  be  given  by  the
        accused  person  to  the  police  officer  either  through a
        medical practitioner or otherwise, as the case may be.
         (2) If any accused person refuses to give samples as
        provided in sub-section (1), in a trial under this Act,  the
        court shall draw adverse inference against the accused.
        23.      Public  Prosecutors.-  (1)  For every Special Court,
        the Central Government or, as the case  may  be,  the  State
        Government,   shall  appoint  a  person  to  be  the  Public
        Prosecutor and may appoint one or more  persons  to  be  the
        Additional    Public   Prosecutor   or   Additional   Public
         Provided that the Central Government or, as the case
        may be, the State Government, may also appoint for any  case
        or class or group of cases, a Special Public Prosecutor.
         (2)  A person shall not be qualified to be appointed
        as a Public Prosecutor or an Additional Public Prosecutor or
        a Special Public Prosecutor under this section unless he has
        been in practice as an Advocate for
        not less than seven years or has held any post, for a period
        of not less than seven years, under the Union  or  a  State,
        requiring special knowledge of law.
         (3) Every person appointed as a Public Prosecutor or
        an   Additional   Public  Prosecutor  or  a  Special  Public
        Prosecutor under this section shall be deemed to be a Public
        Prosecutor within the meaning of clause (u) of section 2  of
        the  Code,  and the provisions of the Code shall have effect
        24.      Procedure and powers of Special Courts.- (1) Subject
        to the provisions  of  sub-section  (5)  of  section  31,  a
        Special  Court  may  take cognizance of any offence, without
        the accused being committed to it for trial, upon  receiving
        a complaint of facts which constitute such offence or upon a
        police report of such facts.
         (2)  Where  an offence triable by a Special Court is
        punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding  three
        years  or  with  fine  or  with both, the Special Court may,
        notwithstanding anything contained  in  sub-section  (1)  of
        section 260 or section 262 of the Code, try the offence in a
        summary  way  in accordance with the procedure prescribed in
        the Code and the provisions of sections 263 to  265  of  the
        Code, shall so far as may be, apply to such trial:
         Provided that when, in the course of a summary trial
        under this sub-section, it appears to the Special Court that
        the nature of the case is such that it is undesirable to try
        it  in  a  summary  way,  the Special Court shall recall any
        witnesses who may have been examined and proceed to  re-hear
        the  case  in  the  manner provided by the provisions of the
        Code for the trial of such offence and the  said  provisions
        shall  apply  to  and in relation to a Special Court as they
        apply to and in relation to a Magistrate:
         Provided further that in the case of any  conviction
        in  a  summary  trial under this section, it shall be lawful
        for a Special Court to pass a sentence of imprisonment for a
        term not exceeding two years.
         (3) Subject to the other provisions of this  Act,  a
        Special  Court  shall,  for  the  purpose  of  trial  of any
        offence, have all the powers of a Court of Session and shall
        try such offence as if it were a Court of Session so far  as
        may  be  in  accordance with the procedure prescribed in the
        Code for the trial before a Court of Session.
         (4) Subject to the other  provisions  of  this  Act,
        every  case  transferred to a Special Court under section 20
        shall be dealt with as if such  case  had  been  transferred
        under section 406 of the Code to such Special Court.
         (5)   Notwithstanding  anything  contained  in,  but
        subject to the provisions of section 299,  of  the  Code,  a
        Special  Court  may,  if it thinks fit and for reasons to be
        recorded by it, proceed with the trial in the absence of the
        accused or his  pleader  and  record  the  evidence  of  any
        witness,  subject  to the right of the accused to recall the
        witness for cross-examination.
        25.      Protection  of   witnesses.-   (1)   Notwithstanding
        anything  contained  in the Code, the proceedings under this
        Act may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, be  held  in
        camera if the Special Court so desires.
         (2)  A Special Court, if on an application made by a
        witness in  any  proceeding  before  it  or  by  the  Public
        Prosecutor  in  relation  to  such  witnesses  or on its own
        motion, is satisfied that the life of  such  witness  is  in
        danger,  it may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, take
        such measures as it deems fit for keeping the  identity  and
        address of such witness secret.
         (3)  In  particular,  and  without  prejudice to the
        generality  of  the  provisions  of  sub-section  (2),   the
        measures   which   a  Special  Court  may  take  under  that
        sub-section may include -
         (a)     the holding of the proceedings at a place to
        be decided by the Special Court;
         (b)     the avoiding of the mention of the names and
        addresses of the witnesses in its orders or judgments or  in
        any records of the case accessible to public;
         (c)  the issuing of any directions for securing that
        the identity and address of the witnesses are not disclosed;
         (d)     that it is in the public interest  to  order
        that  all  or  any  of the proceedings pending before such a
        court shall not be published in any manner.
         (4) Any person who contravenes any direction  issued
        under  sub-section (3) shall be punishable with imprisonment
        for a term which may extend to one year and with fine  which
        may extend to one thousand rupees.
        26.      Trial  by  Special  Courts  to have precedence.- The
        trial under this Act of any offence by a Special Court shall
        have precedence over the trial of any other case against the
        accused in any other court(not being a  Special  Court)  and
        shall  be concluded in preference to the trial of such other
        case and accordingly the trial  of  such  other  case  shall
        remain in abeyance.
        27.      Certain  confessions  made  to Police officers to be
        taken into consideration.- (1) Notwithstanding  anything  in
        the Code or in the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, but subject to
        the  provisions  of  this  section,  a  confession made by a
        person before a police officer not  lower  in  rank  than  a
        Superintendent of Police and recorded by such police officer
        either   in   writing  or  on  any  mechanical  device  like
        cassettes, tapes or sound tracks from out of which sound  or
        images  can  be reproduced, shall be admissible in the trial
        of such person for an offence under this Act or  rules  made
         (2)  A  police  officer  shall, before recording any
        confession made by a person under sub-section (1) explain to
        such person in writing that  he  is  not  bound  to  make  a
        confession  and  that  if he does so, it may be used against
         Provided that where such person  prefers  to  remain
        silent  the police officer shall not compel or induce him to
        make any confession.
         (3)  The  confession  shall  be   recorded   in   an
        atmosphere  free  from  threat or inducement and shall be in
        the same language in which the person makes it.
         (4) The person  from  whom  a  confession  has  been
        recorded under sub-section (1), shall be produced before the
        Court  of  a Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or the court of a
        Chief Judicial Magistrate along with the original  statement
        of   confession,   written  or  recorded  on  mechanical  or
        electronic device within 48 hours.
         (5) The Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or  the  Chief
        Judicial   Magistrate,   shall,   scrupulously   record  the
        statement, if any, made by the person so  produced  and  get
        his signature and if there is any complaint of torture, such
        person   shall  be  directed  to  be  produced  for  medical
        examination before a Medical Officer not lower in rank  than
        an  Assistant Civil Surgeon and thereafter, he shall be sent
        to judicial custody.
        28.      Power to transfer cases to regular  courts.-  Where,
        after  taking  cognizance of any offence, a Special Court is
        of the opinion that the offence is not  triable  by  it,  it
        shall,  notwithstanding  that  it has no jurisdiction to try
        such offence, transfer  the  case  for  the  trial  of  such
        offence  to any court having jurisdiction under the Code and
        the court to which the case is transferred may proceed  with
        the  trial  of  the offence as if it had taken cognizance of
        the offence.
        29.      Appeal.- (1) Notwithstanding anything  contained  in
        the  Code, an appeal shall lie as a matter of right from any
        judgment, sentence or  order,  not  being  an  interlocutory
        order,  of  a  Special Court to the High Court both on facts
        and on law.
        Explanation - For the purposes of this section,  High  Court
        means  a  High  Court  within  whose jurisdiction, a Special
        Court which passed  the  judgment,  sentence  or  order,  is
         (2) Every appeal under sub-section(1) shall be heard
        by a bench of two Judges of the High Court.
         (3) Except as aforesaid, no appeal or revision shall
        lie  to  any  court  from  any  judgment,  sentence or order
        including an interlocutory order of a Special Court.
         (4)   Notwithstanding    anything    contained    in
        sub-section (3) of the Code, an appeal shall lie to the High
        Court  against  an  order  of  the Special Court granting or
        refusing bail.
         (5)  Every  appeal  under  this  section  shall   be
        preferred  within  a  period of thirty days from the date of
        the judgment, sentence or order appealed from:
         Provided that the High Court may entertain an appeal
        after the expiry of the said period of thirty days if it  is
        satisfied  that  the  appellant had sufficient cause for not
        preferring the appeal within the period of thirty days.
        PART IV
        30.      Modified application of certain  provisions  of  the
        Code.- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code or
        any other law, every offence punishable under this Act shall
        be  deemed  to be a cognizable offence within the meaning of
        clause(c) of section 2 of the Code, and "cognizable case" as
        defined in that clause shall be construed accordingly.
         (2) Section 167 of the Code shall apply in  relation
        to  a  case  involving  an offence punishable under this Act
        subject to the modifications that, in sub-section (2),-
         (a) the references to  "fifteen  days",  "ninety
                        days" and "sixty days", wherever they occur,
                        shall  be construed as references to "thirty
                        days", "ninety days"  and  "ninety  days"  ,
                        respectively; and
         (b) after  the  proviso,  the following provisos
                        shall be inserted, namely:-
         "Provided further that if  it  is  not  possible  to
        complete  the investigation within the said period of ninety
        days,the Special Court shall extend the said period upto one
        hundred and  eighty  days,  on  the  report  of  the  Public
        Prosecutor  indicating the progress of the investigation and
        the specific reasons for the detention of the accused beyond
        the said period of ninety days:
         Provided also that if the police officer making  the
        investigation  under  this  Act, requests for police custody
        from judicial custody of any person,  for  the  purposes  of
        investigation,  he  shall  file  an  affidavit  stating  the
        reasons for doing so and shall also explain  the  delay,  if
        any, for requesting such police custody".
         (3)  Section 268 of the Code shall apply in relation
        to a case involving an offence  punishable  under  this  Act
        subject to the modifications that-
         (a) the reference in sub-section (1) thereof-
         (i)  to "the State Government" shall be construed as
        a  reference  to  "the  Central  Government  or  the   State
         (ii)  to  "order  of  the State Government" shall be
        construed as a reference to "order of the Central Government
        or the State Government, as the case may be"; and
         (b) the reference in  sub-section  (2)  thereof,  to
        "State  Government"  shall  be  construed  as a reference to
        "Central Government or the State Government, as the case may
         (4) Sections 366, 367 and  371  of  the  Code  shall
        apply  in relation to a case involving an offence triable by
        a Special  Court  subject  to  the  modifications  that  the
        reference   to   "Court  of  Session",  whereever  occurring
        therein, shall be construed as  the  reference  to  "Special
         (5)  Nothing  in section 438 of the Code shall apply
        in relation to any case involving the arrest of  any  person
        on  an  accusation of having committed an offence punishable
        under this Act.
         (6) Notwithstanding anything contained in the  Code,
        no  person  accused  of an offence punishable under this Act
        shall, if in custody, be released on bail or on his own bond
        unless the Public Prosecutor has been given  an  opportunity
        to oppose the application for such release.
         (7)   Where   the   public  prosecutor  opposes  the
        application of the accused to release  on  bail,  no  person
        accused  of an offence punishable under this Act or any rule
        made thereunder shall be released on bail until the court is
        satisfied that there are grounds for believing  that  he  is
        not guilty of committing such offence.
         (8) The limitations on granting of bail specified in
        sub-sections  (6) and (7) are in addition to the limitations
        under the Code or any other law for the time being in  force
        on granting of bail.
         (9)    Notwithstanding    anything    contained   in
        sub-sections (6), (7) and (8), no bail shall be granted to a
        person accused of an offence punishable under this  Act,  if
        he  is  not  an  Indian  citizen  except in very exceptional
        circumstances and for reasons to be recorded therefor.
        31.      Cognizance of  offences.-  (1)  The  police  officer
        recording  information  in  respect of an offence under this
        Act shall  promptly  forward  copies  of  all  the  material
        including  information given to the police under section 154
        of the Code and its accompaniments to the  Director  General
        of Police and the Review Committee.
         (2)  It  shall  be  open  to the Director General of
        Police or the Review Committee  to  call  for  such  further
        information,  as they may deem necessary, from the police or
        any other person before approving or disapproving the action
        taken by the subordinate authorities.
         (3) If the  Director  General  of  Police  does  not
        approve  the  recording  of the aforesaid information within
        ten days, or the Review Committee does not approve the  same
        within  thirty  days,  the recording of the said information
        shall become null and void with effect from the tenth, or as
        the case may be, the thirtieth day and  all  proceedings  in
        that  behalf  shall stand withdrawn and if the accused is in
        custody, he shall be released forthwith unless  required  in
        connection with some other offence.
         (4)  Any action taken or any order passed under this
        section shall be in  addition  to  and  independent  of  any
        action taken by the Review Committee under section 39.
         (5)  No  court  shall take cognizance of any offence
        under this Act without the previous sanction  of  the  State
        Government, or as the case may be, the Central Government.
        32.      Officers  competent  to  investigate  offences under
        this Act.Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code,  no
        police officer below the rank,-
         (a)   in  the  case  of  the  Delhi  Special  Police
        Establishment, of a Deputy Superintendent  of  Police  or  a
        police officer of equivalent rank;
         (b)  in  the metropolitan areas of Mumbai, Calcutta,
        Chennai  and  Ahmedabad  and  any  other  metropolitan  area
        notified  as  such under sub-section (1) of section 8 of the
        Code, of an Assistant Commissioner of Police;
         (c) in any other case not relatable to clause(a)  or
        clause (b), of a Deputy Superintendent of Police or a police
        officer of equivalent rank,
        shall investigate any offence punishable under this Act.
        33.      Arrest.-  (1)  Whenever  any  person,  who  being  a
        citizen of India, is arrested,  information  of  his  arrest
        shall be immediately communicated by the police officer to a
        family  member  or to a relative of such person by telegram,
        telephone or by any other means which shall be  recorded  by
        the  police  officer  under  the  signature  of  the  person
         (2) Where a police  officer  arrests  a  person,  he
        shall prepare a custody memo of the person arrested.
         (3)     During    the   interrogation,   the   legal
        practitioner of the person  arrested  shall  be  allowed  to
        remain  present and the person arrested shall be informed of
        his right as soon as he is brought to the police station.
        34.      Presumption as to offences under section 3.- (1)  In
        a  prosecution  for  an  offence  under  sub-section  (1) of
        section 3, if it is proved-
         (a)  that  the  arms  or  explosives  or  any  other
        substances  specified  in  section 3 were recovered from the
        possession of the accused and there  is  reason  to  believe
        that  such  arms  or  explosives  or  other  substances of a
        similar nature, were used in the commission of such offence;
         (b)  that  by  the  evidence  of   an   expert   the
        finger-prints  of  the accused were found at the site of the
        offence or on anything including arms and vehicles  used  in
        connection with the commission of such offence,
        the  Special  Court shall draw the adverse inference against
        the accused.
         (2)  In  a  prosecution   for   an   offence   under
        sub-section  (3)  of  section  3,  if  it is proved that the
        accused rendered  any  financial  assistance  to  a  person,
        having   knowledge  that  such  person  is  accused  of,  or
        reasonably suspected of, an offence under that section,  the
        Special  Court  shall draw the adverse inference against the
        35.      Saving.- (1) Nothing in this Act  shall  affect  the
        jurisdiction exercisable by, or the procedure applicable to,
        any  court  or other authority under any law relating to the
        naval, military or air forces or other armed forces  of  the
         (2) For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared
        that  for  the purposes of any such law as is referred to in
        sub-section (1), a Special Court shall be  deemed  to  be  a
        court of ordinary criminal justice.
        36.      Overriding effect.- The provisions of this Act shall
        have  effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith
        contained in any enactment other than this  Act  or  in  any
        instrument  having  effect  by virtue of any enactment other
        than this Act.
        37.      Protection  of  action  taken  in  good  faith   and
        punishment  for  corruptly or maliciously proceeding against
        any person under this Act.-  (1)  No  suit,  prosecution  or
        other   legal  proceeding  shall  lie  against  the  Central
        Government or a State Government or any officer or authority
        of the Central Government or State Government or  any  other
        authority on whom powers have been conferred under this Act,
        for  anything which is in good faith done or purported to be
        done in pursuance of this Act:
         Provided further that no suit, prosecution or  other
        legal  proceedings  shall  lie against any serving member or
        retired member of the Armed Forces  or  other  para-military
        forces  in  respect  of  any action taken or purported to be
        taken by him in good faith, in the course of  any  operation
        directed towards combating terrorism.
         (2)  Any police officer exercising powers under this
        Act, who knows that there  are  no  reasonable  grounds  for
        proceeding  under  this Act and yet corruptly or maliciously
        proceeds against any person, for an offence under this  Act,
        shall  be  punishable  with imprisonment which may extend to
        two years, or with fine, or with both.
        38.      In any proceedings under this Act,  if  the  Special
        Court  is  of  opinion that any person has been corruptly or
        maliciously proceeded against,  the  court  may  award  such
        compensation  as  it  deems fit to the person, to be paid by
        the officer, person, authority  or  Government,  as  may  be
        specified in the order.
        39.      Review Committees.- (1) The Central Government shall
        constitute  a Review Committee consisting of the Secretaries
        in charge of the Ministries of Home, Law and Justice and the
        other concerned Ministries, if any, to review, at the end of
        each quarter in a year, the cases instituted by the  Central
        Government under this Act.
         (2)  The Review Committee shall be competent to give
        such directions, as they may think appropriate, with respect
        to the conduct and continuance of any case  or  a  class  of
        cases, as the case may be.
         (3)  Every  State Government shall also constitute a
        Review Committee consisting of the Chief  Secretary  to  the
        Government  and the Secretaries in charge of the Departments
        of Home, Law and the other concerned Departments, if any, to
        review, at the end of each quarter  in  a  year,  the  cases
        instituted by the State Government under this Act.
         (4)  The Review Committee shall be competent to give
        such directions, as they may think appropriate, with respect
        to the conduct and continuance of any case  or  a  class  of
        cases, as the case may be.
        40.      Power  of High Courts to make rules.- The High Court
        may, by notification in  the  Official  Gazette,  make  such
        rules, if any, as it may deem necessary for carrying out the
        provisions of this Act relating to Special Courts.
        41.      Power to make rules.- (1)      Without prejudice to
        the  powers  of  the High Courts to make rules under section
        39, the Central  Government  may,  by  notification  in  the
        Official Gazette, make rules for carrying out the provisions
        of this Act.
         (2)  In  particular,  and  without  prejudice to the
        generality of the foregoing power, such  rules  may  provide
        for all or any of the following matters, namely:-
         (a)     regulating the conduct of persons in respect
        of  areas  the  control  of which is considered necessary or
        expedient and the removal of such persons from such areas;
         (b)     the entry into, and search of,-
         (i)     any vehicle, vessel or aircraft;
         (ii)    any place, whatsoever,
         reasonably suspected of being  used  for  committing
        the  offences  referred  to in section 3 or section 4 or for
        manufacturing or storing anything for the commission of  any
        such offence;
         (c)     conferring powers upon,-
         (i)     the Central Government;
         (ii)    a State Government;
         (iii) an  Administrator of a Union Territory under
                        Article 239 of the Constitution;
         (iv) an officer of  the  Central  Government  not
                        lower   in   rank   than  that  of  a  Joint
                        Secretary; or
         (v) an officer of a State Government  not  lower
                        in rank than that of a District Magistrate,
         to make general or special orders to prevent or cope
        with terrorist acts;
         (d)     the arrest and trial of persons contravening
        any of the rules or any order made thereunder;
         (e)     the punishment of any person who contravenes
        or  attempts  to contravene or abets or attempts to abet the
        contravention of any rule  or  order  made  thereunder  with
        imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year or fine
        or both.
         (f)     providing  for  the seizure and detention of
        any property in respect of which such contravention, attempt
        or abetment as  is  referred  to  in  clause  (e)  has  been
        committed  and  for  the  adjudication  of  such seizure and
        detention, whether by any court or by any other authority.